Analysis of Compensation Structures and the Transformation of the Japanese Firm Using the Matched Personnel and Employee Survey Data

本研究以日本某制造企业为研究对象，运用个人资料与员工调查结果，检视绩效人力资源制度改革与用工调整的成效。分析揭示了两个主要发现。首先，人力资源体制改革对员工的工作积极性产生了复杂的影响。技能等级制度逐渐产生了以资历为导向的偏见，如自动升级和非管理人员在非管理人员队伍的顶层堆积。为了解决这些问题，公司在2000年引入了职位等级制度。在从技能等级制向工作等级制转变的过程中，公司对人员进行了系统的重新分级。利用与人员数据相匹配的调查结果，估计了重新分级对工作努力的影响。结果表明，虽然升级的管理者提高了他们的工作努力，但其他员工的工作努力却有所下降。其次，采用买断框架的就业调整会引发“逆向选择”。研究人员将1993年和1996年接受买断的员工与自愿离职或留下的员工的绩效评分进行了比较。对于1993年的买断，虽然买断者的技能等级水平相对较高，但他们的绩效等级与在职者相同，低于自愿离职者。因此，买断者就是公司想要解雇的人。对于1996年的买断，尽管买断者的绩效评级与在职管理者的绩效评级相同，但非管理层、排名较低的买断者的评级高于在职者，与自愿离职者的评级相同。因此，非管理层买断者是公司希望保留的人。尽管该公司努力确保留住有价值的员工，但无法具体说明哪些人接受了买断。

This research examines the outcomes of the performance-based HR system reform and employment adjustments in a Japanese manufacturing company, using the personnel data and the employee survey results. The analysis reveals two main findings.First, the HR system reform has generated mixed effects on the work effort of employees. The skill grade system had gradually produced seniority-oriented bias, such as automatic upgrading and the pileup of non-managerial employees at the top tier of non-managerial ranks. The company introduced the job grade system in 2000 to cope with those problems. In the transition from the skill grade to the job grade system, the company systematically re-graded people. Using the survey results matched with the personnel data, the impact of the re-grading on the work effort was estimated. The results show that although up-graded managers improved their work effort, the rest of employees experienced the decline of work effort.Second, employment adjustment using a buyout framework invites "adverse selection." Performance ratings for employees who accepted buyouts in 1993 and 1996 are compared with those of employees who remained or left voluntarily. For the 1993 buyout, while the skill grade level of buyout takers are relatively high, their performance ratings are the same as those of incumbents and lower than those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the buyout takers were those whom the company wanted to dismiss. For the 1996 buyout, although performance ratings of buyout takers were the same as those of incumbents in the case of managers, the ratings of non-managerial, lower ranked buyout takers were higher than those of incumbents and the same as those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the non-managerial buyout takers were those whom the company would have preferred to retain. The company was unable to specify who took buyouts despite efforts to ensure retention of valued employees.