Analysis of Compensation Structures and the Transformation of the Japanese Firm Using the Matched Personnel and Employee Survey Data

本研究利用员工资料及员工调查结果，检视一家日本制造企业绩效人力资源制度改革与用工调整的结果。研究发现，人力资源制度改革对员工的工作努力产生了不同程度的影响。技能等级制度逐渐产生了以资历为导向的偏见，如自动晋升和非管理人员在最高级别的非管理人员堆积。该公司于2000年引入了职级制度，以应对这些问题。在从技能等级制向职级制过渡的过程中，公司系统地对人进行了重新评级。利用与人员数据相匹配的调查结果，估计重新评分对工作努力的影响。结果表明，虽然晋升的管理者提高了他们的工作努力，但其余的员工经历了工作努力的下降。第二，采用买断框架的就业调整会招致“逆向选择”。1993年和1996年接受买断的员工的表现评级与自愿留下或离开的员工的绩效评级进行了比较。在1993年的买断行动中，虽然买断者的技术水平较高，但他们的表现评分与在职人士相同，但较自愿离职者为低。因此，买断者是公司想要解雇的人。在1996年的买断行动中，虽然买断者的表现评分与现任经理的相同，但非管理层、职级较低的买断者的表现评分则较现任者高，与自愿离职者的评分相同。因此，非管理层买断者是公司更愿意留住的人。该公司无法具体说明谁接受了买断，尽管该公司努力确保留住有价值的员工。

This research examines the outcomes of the performance-based HR system reform and employment adjustments in a Japanese manufacturing company, using the personnel data and the employee survey results. The analysis reveals two main findings.First, the HR system reform has generated mixed effects on the work effort of employees. The skill grade system had gradually produced seniority-oriented bias, such as automatic upgrading and the pileup of non-managerial employees at the top tier of non-managerial ranks. The company introduced the job grade system in 2000 to cope with those problems. In the transition from the skill grade to the job grade system, the company systematically re-graded people. Using the survey results matched with the personnel data, the impact of the re-grading on the work effort was estimated. The results show that although up-graded managers improved their work effort, the rest of employees experienced the decline of work effort.Second, employment adjustment using a buyout framework invites "adverse selection." Performance ratings for employees who accepted buyouts in 1993 and 1996 are compared with those of employees who remained or left voluntarily. For the 1993 buyout, while the skill grade level of buyout takers are relatively high, their performance ratings are the same as those of incumbents and lower than those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the buyout takers were those whom the company wanted to dismiss. For the 1996 buyout, although performance ratings of buyout takers were the same as those of incumbents in the case of managers, the ratings of non-managerial, lower ranked buyout takers were higher than those of incumbents and the same as those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the non-managerial buyout takers were those whom the company would have preferred to retain. The company was unable to specify who took buyouts despite efforts to ensure retention of valued employees.