Financing Public Pension and During the Aged Period

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(1) The research quantitatively shows how much social security tax preferences are given to non-working housewives under the Japanese current social security system. These preferences of course as disincentives for the work that the current social security system gives to the housewives.(2) The study forcasted the balance of social security fund covering the period up to the past half of the twenty-second century using a over-lapping generation model for simulation. It reveals that the balance turns negative in year 2050. The research shows, however, that if tax preferences for non-working housewives are repealed, then the social security fund will remain positive throughout the studied period.(3) The research reveals the distribution impact upon different generations of the pension reform that repeals the preferences for non-working housewives. The study shows that the above reform equalizes net pension burden of each generation.