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Economic Policy of Horizontal Competition Restraint

限制同业竞争的经济政策

基本信息

批准号：
13630060
负责人：
YANAGAWA Takashi
金额：
$ 2.18万
依托单位：
Kobe University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2001
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2001 至 2003
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

Our major research topics are : (1) the effect of surcharge on the cartel deterrence, and study of the desirable surcharge system. (2) worldwide market concentration of major industries due to the market globalization, and (3) the effect of the various corporate strategies on the market concentration and economic welfare.As for (1), we analyzed theoretically the effect of various surcharge bases and surcharge rates on the cartel deterrence and economic welfare. We conclude that the surcharge system based on damages is preferred in the sense that it can increase output of a cartel.As for (2), we find that the concentration ratios of major industries are not increasing so rapidly recently when we see the concentration trends after 1980s, even though we have seen many mergers and acquisitions since the late 1990s. However, we find that the mergers and acquisitions, and many types of coalitions raise the concentration ratios calculated by groups of firms.As for (3), we consider the problems of consolidation of Japan Airlines and Japan Air System from the viewpoint of competition policy. We point out that the more slots for departing and landing should have been returned for encouraging new entry, that a duopoly of equally competitive airlines after merger may be easier to collude than oligopoly which consists of one dominant firm and two fringes, and that competition might be restricted on the routes where the super express trains are not good substitutes for passengers. Also we consider intervention in airfares of Japan Fair Trade Commission after the de-regulation. We conclude that intervening in airfares was necessary to stop predation and keep long-run competition in the market, but price-cost relationship should have been analyzed, and length and the order of price-cut should have been specified.

我们的主要研究课题是：（1）附加费对卡特尔威慑的作用，以及对理想的附加费制度的研究。(2)（3）不同的企业战略对市场集中度和经济福利的影响。对于（1），我们从理论上分析了不同的附加费基数和附加费费率对卡特尔威慑和经济福利的影响。我们的结论是，基于损害赔偿的附加费制度在提高卡特尔产量的意义上是可取的。关于（2），我们发现，尽管从90年代后期开始出现了大量的兼并和收购，但从80年代以后的集中度趋势来看，主要行业的集中度并没有像现在这样迅速上升。但是，我们发现，合并、收购和多种形式的联合会提高了企业集团的集中度。关于（3），我们从竞争政策的观点来考虑日本航空公司和日本航空系统的合并问题。我们指出，更多的起飞和降落的位置应该被退还，以鼓励新的进入，合并后的航空公司的平等竞争的双寡头垄断可能更容易串通比寡头垄断，由一个主导公司和两个边缘，竞争可能会被限制在超高速列车不是很好的乘客替代品的航线。此外，我们还考虑了日本公平交易委员会在放松管制后对机票的干预。我们的结论是，干预机票价格是必要的，以制止掠夺和保持长期的市场竞争，但价格成本关系应进行分析，并应明确的长度和降价的顺序。