The effects for accounting regulation for business combinations on firm behaviours and stock pricing : a theory and tests

本研究以实证的方式，探讨投资者如何依据会计资讯形成预期，以及企业如何选择会计与确认时机。第三章是企业合并的规制。首先，我确认报表和资产负债表信息的补充作用。研究发现，盈余-帐面价值（托姆趋势）模型能较好地解释1967-2001年东京证券交易所上市的531家公司的股价水平和变动。第二，通过对1964-2001年东京证交所上市公司的面板数据分析，发现成长型公司倾向于采用保守的会计计量方法，而不是延迟确认收益;公司在面临股利政策冲突时，倾向于采用保守的会计计量方法;我的集体证据为企业合并提供了一个监管解释。在平等基础上进行的并购，由于管理控制权尚未确立，导致利益相关者之间的冲突严重。在这种情况下，理性的利益相关者会倾向于保守的会计，不能高估资产，例如，池法。联营法的使用必须具备一定的条件，限制盈余管理。

This research empirically examines (1)how investors are forming the expectation based on accounting information, and (2)how a firm selects the accounting and recognition timing. I discuss the regulation setting of business combinations. First, I confirm a supplementary role of the statement and balance sheet information. I find that the earnings-book value (with tome trend) model better explained the level and change of stock prices in 531 firms which had been listed in the TSE (Tokyo Stock Exchange) for the period of 1967-2001. Second, the panel analysis of TSE firms in 1964-2001, shows that (1)the growth firms prefer conservative accounting measurement to income recognition delay, (2)firms facing more severe conflicts over devidend policy tend to select more conservative accounting, (3)a manager tends underestimate earnings rather than net assets. My collective evidence provides a regulatory explanation for business combinations. A merger on an equal basis has the severe conflicts among stakeholders because the management control has not established. In such case, rational stakeholders would prefer conservative accounting that could not overestimate assets, for example, the pooling method. The use of pooling method must certain conditions that limit earnings management.