The Welfare Analysis of Compulsory Nonprofit Status in the Market for Services with Non-contractible Quality.

在日本，私立医院必须具有非营利地位。最近，关于营利性医院是否应该被允许进入医疗保健市场的争论不断。为了回答这个问题，我们比较了两种不同环境下的福利。一是对所有医院实施非分配约束（NDC）。另一种是每家医院可以选择是否参加NDC，为了比较这两种情况下的福利，我们构建了一个理论模型。然后，它被证明，采取NDC作为一个信号，高质量的供应商时，每个医院有选择的NDC或不。而且，当NDC是可选的时，存在着为非营利医院服务和营利医院服务清除市场的收费组合，此外，可选NDC下的福利等于或优于强制NDC下的福利。

It has been mandatory for private hospitals to have the not-for-profit status in Japan. Recently, there is debate on whether for-profit hospitals should be allowed to enter the health care market or not. To answer this question, we compare welfare in two different settings. One is that the non-distribution constraint (NDC) is enforced on all hospitals. Another is that each hospital can choose taking the NDC or not.To make a comparison of welfare in these two settings, we constructed a theoretical model. Then, it is demonstrated that taking the NDC serves as a signal of high quality supplier when each hospital has the option of taking the NDC or not. And, when the NDC is optional, there exist fee combinations which clear both of the markets for not-for-profit hospital service and for for-profit hospital service and, moreover, the welfare under optional NDC is equal to or better than the welfare under the compulsory NDC.