The Welfare Analysis of Compulsory Nonprofit Status in the Market for Services with Non-contractible Quality.

不可契约质量服务市场中强制非营利地位的福利分析。

• 批准号: 19530218
• 负责人: AOKI Ken
• 金额: $ 2.91万
• 依托单位: Sophia University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2007 至 2009
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-19530218/
• 关键词: 非営利; 医療経済; 非分配制約; 契約できない品質; 品質のシグナル; 病院; 連携

It has been mandatory for private hospitals to have the not-for-profit status in Japan. Recently, there is debate on whether for-profit hospitals should be allowed to enter the health care market or not. To answer this question, we compare welfare in two different settings. One is that the non-distribution constraint (NDC) is enforced on all hospitals. Another is that each hospital can choose taking the NDC or not.To make a comparison of welfare in these two settings, we constructed a theoretical model. Then, it is demonstrated that taking the NDC serves as a signal of high quality supplier when each hospital has the option of taking the NDC or not. And, when the NDC is optional, there exist fee combinations which clear both of the markets for not-for-profit hospital service and for for-profit hospital service and, moreover, the welfare under optional NDC is equal to or better than the welfare under the compulsory NDC.

在日本，私立医院必须具有非营利地位。最近，关于营利性医院是否应该被允许进入医疗保健市场的争论不断。为了回答这个问题，我们比较了两种不同环境下的福利。一是对所有医院实施非分配约束（NDC）。另一种是每家医院可以选择是否参加NDC，为了比较这两种情况下的福利，我们构建了一个理论模型。然后，它被证明，采取NDC作为一个信号，高质量的供应商时，每个医院有选择的NDC或不。而且，当NDC是可选的时，存在着为非营利医院服务和营利医院服务清除市场的收费组合，此外，可选NDC下的福利等于或优于强制NDC下的福利。

项目成果

A Note on the Distinction between Two Market Conditions in Japanese Health Care Market: Excess Demand vs SID

关于日本医疗保健市场两种市场状况区别的说明：需求过剩与 SID

• 发表时间: 2008
• 作者: 青木研;青木研;青木 研;青木 研;青木研;青木研;青木 研;青木研
• 通讯作者: 青木研

A Note on the Distinction between Two Market Conditions in Japanese Health Care Market : Excess Demand vs SID

日本医疗保健市场两种市场状况的区别：需求过剩与 SID

• 发表时间: 2008
• 作者: 青木研;青木研;青木 研;青木 研;青木研;青木研;青木 研;青木研;青木 研
• 通讯作者: 青木 研

Coordination or Integration: A Comparative Study on Performance of Health Care Delivery Systems

协调或整合：医疗保健服务系统绩效的比较研究

• 发表时间: 2009
• 作者: 青木研;青木研;青木 研;青木 研;青木研
• 通讯作者: 青木研

"The Welfare Effect of Banning Signaling in Not-for-Profit Industries, " Proceedings of iHEA 6th World Congress at Copenhagen

“非营利行业中禁止信号传输的福利效应”，哥本哈根 iHEA 第六届世界大会论文集

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: Social Science Research Network
• 作者: 青木研

The Welfare Effect of Banning Signaling in Not-for-Profit Industries

非营利行业中禁止信号传输的福利效应

• 发表时间: 2007
• 期刊: Proceedings of iHEA 6th World Congress
• 作者: 青木研;青木研;青木 研
• 通讯作者: 青木 研