A Comparative Study of Theory of Perception in Indian Buddhist Epistemology and Analytical Philosophy

本文通过对《法华经》第三卷第448-459页和《金刚经》的文本分析，阐明了佛教知觉理论中外物、心象和自我意识的复杂性，以及概念结构的作用（vikalpa/kalpana）或知觉判断（adhyavasaya）在持认知与虚假心象的观点之间的争论中讨论（alikakaravada）和认知与真正的心理形象（satyakaravvada）。虽然后一个问题可能与W.塞拉斯的论点被称为“给定的神话”，它质疑心理图像是否是命题或没有，它不应该被忽视的是，印度的认识论，预设了一定的合理性连接到自己的救赎论不认为心理图像，不像感觉材料，作为经验知识的基础。

On the basis of text-analysis of Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika III 448-459 and Ratnakirit's Citradvaitaprakasavada, the present study has clarified a way for understanding the complex among external objects, mental images, and self-awareness in the Buddhist theory of perception, and the role of conceptual constructions (vikalpa/kalpana) or perceptual judgments (adhyavasaya) discussed in the controversy between the views holding cognition with false mental images (alikakaravada) and cognition with true mental images (satyakaravvada). Although the latter problem might be connected with W. Sellars's argument known as "Myth of Given," which questions whether mental images are propositional or not, it should not be overlooked that Indian epistemology that presupposes a certain rationality connected with its own soteriology does not regard the mental images, unlike sense data, as the foundation of empirical knowledge.