An analysis of auction theory for multi-objects and real options incorporating game theory under strategic complementarities

在这项研究中，我们得到了以下两个结果。首先，我们给出了一类有限视界随机对策存在马尔可夫纯策略完美均衡的充分条件，其中任意阶段对策都具有策略互补。其次，我们研究了一个游戏，在这个游戏中，一个现有者和一个进入者决定进入一个新市场的时间。现任者私下知道这些信息，并有动机推迟投资时机，以便在战略上隐藏这些信息。我们描述了这个信号博弈的均衡，并给出了社会福利被扭曲的条件。

In this research, we obtained the following two results. First of all, we provide the sufficient conditions for a Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies to exist for a class of stochastic games with finite horizon, in which any stage game has strategic complementarities. Secondly, we investigated a game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new market. The incumbent privately knows the information and has an incentive to delay the timing of the investment in order to hide the information strategically. We characterize the equilibria of this signaling game and give the conditions in which the social welfare is distorted.