An analysis of auction theory for multi-objects and real options incorporating game theory under strategic complementarities

在本研究中，我们得到了以下两个结果。首先，给出了一类任意阶段博弈具有战略互补性的有限时间随机对策在纯策略下存在马尔可夫完全均衡的充分条件。其次，我们研究了一个博弈，其中在位者和进入者决定进入一个新市场的时机。现任者私下知道这些信息，并有动机推迟投资的时机，以便战略性地隐藏信息。我们刻画了这一信号博弈的均衡，给出了社会福利被扭曲的条件。

In this research, we obtained the following two results. First of all, we provide the sufficient conditions for a Markov perfect equilibrium in pure strategies to exist for a class of stochastic games with finite horizon, in which any stage game has strategic complementarities. Secondly, we investigated a game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new market. The incumbent privately knows the information and has an incentive to delay the timing of the investment in order to hide the information strategically. We characterize the equilibria of this signaling game and give the conditions in which the social welfare is distorted.