Neurophilosophical assessment of the representational theory of consciousness

意识表征理论的神经哲学评估

• 批准号: 22720014
• 负责人: SUZUKI Takayuki
• 金额: $ 2.16万
• 依托单位: Nanzan University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2010 至 2012
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-22720014/
• 关键词: 哲学原論; 各論; 意識; 現象的意識; 表象理論; 自然主義; 神経哲学; クオリア; 表象

In this research project, I found the following things. The arguments that claim we cannot understand conscious experience within the scientific framework have various problems. The representational theory of consciousness, which claims that conscious experiences are essentially mental states representing how the external world is, can explain systematically various features of conscious experience and therefore is the most promising theory about consciousness. Though the theory has several serious problems, we can fend them off by re-examining the concept of representation used in the theory.

在这个研究项目中，我发现了以下几点。那些声称我们不能在科学框架内理解意识经验的论点有各种问题。意识表征理论认为，意识经验本质上是一种精神状态，它能系统地解释意识经验的各种特征，是关于意识的最有前途的理论。尽管该理论有几个严重的问题，但我们可以通过重新审视该理论中使用的表征概念来避免这些问题。