Real Option and Investment Decision

实物期权与投资决策

• 批准号: 23530450
• 负责人: KATSURAYAMA Yasunori
• 金额: $ 1.25万
• 依托单位: Waseda University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2011 至 2013
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-23530450/
• 关键词: リアルオプション; 投資意思決定

In this research, the situation where there exists agency relationship between manager and investors is considered. Investors are contract with managers to run their company. Usually there are conflicts of interest called agency problem. One of the causes of the agency problem is a difference of the time horizon between two parties. It is modeled via the real option problem which enables us to deal with the flexibility of the management. For example the manager has an opportunity to reduce the size of investment by introducing a new technology which is costly. The effects of time horizon are analyzed.Empirical study around SEOs(Seasoned Equity Offering) are also analyzed. Especially the cumulative abnormal return around Japanese SEO and the effect of law reforms are reported.

本研究考虑了管理者与投资者之间存在代理关系的情况。投资者与管理者签订合同来管理他们的公司。通常存在利益冲突，称为代理问题。代理问题的原因之一是双方的时间范围不同。它是通过真实的期权问题，使我们能够处理管理的灵活性建模。例如，管理人员有机会通过引进一种昂贵的新技术来减少投资规模。分析了时间跨度的影响，并对围绕增发的实证研究进行了分析。特别是围绕日本的SEO和法律改革的效果的累积异常收益率报告。

项目成果

SEOs return and Japanese Law Reforms.

SEO 回归和日本法律改革。

• 发表时间: 2014
• 作者: Yasunori Katsurayama;Keiji Abe
• 通讯作者: Keiji Abe

資本予算とリアルオプション

资本预算和实物期权

• 发表时间: 2013
• 期刊: 早稲田商学
• 作者: 葛山康典

SEO returns and Japanese Law Reforms

SEO 回归和日本法律改革

• 发表时间: 2014
• 作者: Yasunori Katsurayama;Keiji Abe
• 通讯作者: Keiji Abe