A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of the Membership, Stategies and Tactics of Dissident Irish Republican Organisations

自1998年签署《耶稣受难日协议》以来，暴力的“持不同政见者”的爱尔兰共和主义一直很明显，但它只得到了少量的学术分析。自1998年以来，持不同政见的爱尔兰共和党人在协议达成后的几个月内在奥马杀害了50多人，并犯下了北爱尔兰最严重的暴行。从2009年到2011年，持不同政见者应对413起枪击和爆炸事件负责，并杀害了两名英国陆军士兵和两名北爱尔兰警察局官员。2010年，军情五处负责人承认，他的组织低估了激进共和主义的持久性。2010年ESRC北爱尔兰选举调查发现，人们对持不同政见者的威胁认知程度存在很大差异，53%的联合主义者认为威胁很大，而天主教徒的这一比例仅为17%。尽管持不同政见者的暴力事件已经发生了一段时间，但关于这个话题的学术文章寥寥无几。在以下方面存在信息差距：谁支持这些组织，为什么支持；对某个特定组织的偏好；持不同政见者希望实现什么，因为暴力显然无法实现统一的爱尔兰的政治目标；如果有的话，什么将缓和他们的做法。该项目通过保证史无前例的渠道对持不同政见者组织的成员进行了非常广泛的采访，旨在纠正在持不同政见者共和党人的组成、动机、组织差异、战略和战术方面明显的知识缺陷。具体地说，该项目希望：评估持不同政见者共和主义的理论和经验发展。这是一种持久的历史现象的一部分，还是对被察觉到的劣势的回应？或者，持不同政见者团体的出现，应该被视为更广泛的全球图景的一部分，被视为所有和平进程的随之而来的一部分，而不是被视为爱尔兰独特“传统”的一部分？考察是什么让持不同政见者团体团结起来，又是什么让他们团结起来。爱尔兰共和党内部出现了许多分歧。为什么持不同政见者团体似乎也容易定期分裂？探索个人支持持不同政见者共和党组织的原因，以及他们选择某个特定组织的基础。他们的动机主要是意识形态、宗派主义、社会条件、家庭传统还是其他动机？分析持不同政见者群体是如何动员起来并试图吸引支持的。橙色秩序游行或治安问题等问题在帮助持不同政见的共和党团体赢得同情方面有多重要？评估持不同政见的共和党人的短期、中期和长期目标。临时爱尔兰共和军使用暴力近30年，但没有实现英国从北爱尔兰撤军。持不同政见者希望达到什么目的，以及他们希望如何通过更大规模的暴力运动实现不可能实现的目标。持不同政见者在多大程度上专注于短期的“成就”，比如民族主义对更强大的安全部队反应的敌意，以此来吸引同情？是否有条件可以实现停火？缺乏授权是否重要(2010年ESRC的调查发现，人们对持不同政见者的同情程度非常低，但并非可以忽略不计)。通过多年来在北爱尔兰问题上建立的联系，竞标者获得了采访每个持不同政见者组织的机会，这是关于持不同政见者共和主义的有限学术工作所缺乏的一个特点。这项研究将提供一种全面的方法，对持不同政见者的发展进行理论化(并质疑该术语的实用性)，同时对谁属于持不同政见者群体--以及为什么--提供迄今最全面的分析。这个项目将成为学术界以外的高调项目。它将产生一本书，几篇期刊文章，两次会议和相当大的媒体报道。这将使试图永久结束暴力的政策制定者受益。

Violent 'dissident' Irish republicanism has been evident since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, yet it has received only a modest amount of academic analysis. Since 1998, dissident Irish republicans have killed over fifty people and committed the worst atrocity in Northern Ireland at Omagh within months of the Agreement. From 2009-11, dissidents were responsible for 413 shootings and bombings and killed two British Army soldiers and two Police Service of Northern Ireland officers. In 2010, the Head of MI5 admitted that his organisation had underestimated the durability of militant republicanism. The 2010 ESRC Northern Ireland Election Survey found considerable differences in the level of threat perception regarding dissidents, with 53% of Unionists believing that threat to be 'major', compared to only 17% of Catholics.Despite dissident violence having occurred for some time, there are only a small number of academic items written on the topic. There are information gaps concerning who supports such groups and why; the preferment for a particular organisation; what dissidents hope to achieve given the apparent inability of violence to achieve the political goal of a united Ireland and what, if anything, would moderate their approach. Using a very wide range of interviews with members of dissident organisation via guaranteed unprecedented access, this project aims to rectify the knowledge deficits evident in respect of the composition, motivations, organisational differences, strategies and tactics of dissident republicans. Specifically, the project wishes to:Assess the theoretical and empirical development of dissident republicanism. Is it part of an enduring historical phenomenon, or a response to perceived disadvantage? Alternatively, should the emergence of dissident groups - or 'spoilers' - be seen as part of a broader global picture, an attendant part of all peace processes rather than be seen as part of a distinctive Irish 'tradition'? Examine what unites and disunites dissident groups. There have been numerous splits amongst Irish republicans. Why do dissident groups also appear liable to regular fracturing?Explore the reasons why individuals back dissident republican organisations and the basis of their selection of a particular organisation. Are they motivated primarily by ideology; sectarianism, social conditions; family tradition or other motivations?Analyse how dissident groups mobilise and attempt to attract support. How important are issues such as Orange Order parades or policing issues in helping dissident republican groups to garner sympathy?Assess the short, medium and long-term aims of dissident republicans. The Provisional IRA used violence for almost three decades yet did not achieve British withdrawal from Northern Ireland. What do dissidents hope to achieve and how do they hope to attain what was impossible via a much larger campaign of violence. To what extent are dissidents fixated on shorter-term 'achievements' such as nationalist hostility to stronger security force responses as means of attracting sympathy? Are there conditions under which ceasefires could be attained? Does the lack of mandate matter (the 2010 ESRC survey found a very low, but not negligible level of sympathy for dissidents)Via contacts developed over years of work on Northern Ireland, the bidders have secured interview access to each dissident organisation, a feature lacking in the limited academic work undertaken on dissident republicanism. The research will offer a holistic approach, theorising the development of dissidence (and questioning the utility of the term) whilst providing the most comprehensive analysis yet of who belongs to dissident groups - and why. This project will be high profile beyond academia. It will yield a book, several journal articles, two conferences and sizeable media coverage. It will benefit policy-makers attempting a permanent end to violence.