Egalitarian media? Internet access and demand for redistribution in the U.S.

我攻读博士学位的目标是研究新媒体和互联网的使用是否改变了美国对再分配政策的需求。不可否认，互联网的引入改变了人们与信息互动的方式：从仅仅是被动的参与者变成了9/13信息的生产者。历史证据表明，扩大所有公民的投票权改变了公共政策的受益者：从精英到新获得选举权的选民[Larcinese(2014)，Lindert(2004)，Husted(1997)]。虽然投票权在美国几乎是普遍的，但互联网可以作为一种权利形式，因为它给了公民发言权和传统媒体没有注意到的想法。第一篇可靠地衡量这种新媒体对美国总统选举的因果影响的论文是Larcineet。艾尔(2017年)。他们发现，互联网普及率对选民投票率有很强的积极影响，而对民主党人的竞选捐款和选票份额的影响较小。不幸的是，互联网传播对政治参与的证据喜忧参半。艾尔(2018)，Falck et.Al.(2014)，Campante et.艾尔(2018)]。关于优先向下再分配，Alesina et.艾尔(2004)有针对性地解释了再分配的需求：贫困人口的份额、政治制度、文化和态度的特点。关于再分配需求的实验证据发现，其主要驱动力是自利、保险动机和与不平等有关的社会担忧[Durante et。艾尔(2014)]。与此相一致，Alesina et.艾尔(2005)强调，对政治行为者的偏好可能反映选民自己对经济状况和不平等决定因素的看法。这就是我想要关注的机制。更多的信息可能会教育选民，影响政治问责和公共政策选择。艾尔(2018)，Prat et。艾尔(2013)，Snyder et.艾尔[2010]]然而，尽管互联网无疑以相对较低的货币成本增加了个人可获得的信息量，但它也可能增加处理这些海量信息的认知和时间成本。首先，有证据表明，媒体行动式的议程制定者，即通过报道某些主题，他们会影响消费者对该主题的相对重要性[Larcinese et。艾尔(2011)，McCombs(2004)]。与这一事实密切相关的是，正如杜兰特等人所发现的那样。艾尔(2018)，更多地接触娱乐电视的人更容易受到民粹主义信息的影响。可以想象，这一证据不仅与传统媒体有关，因为互联网也增加了娱乐机会。因此，这种新媒体的真正威胁是它可能会充当回音室[Garret(2009)，Gentzkow(2011)]，放大议程设置的影响和对大众的脆弱性。为了衡量再分配的需求，我将构造一个变量来捕捉预分配候选人获得的选票份额。为此，我将使用两个数据集。第一个是美国总统选举地图集提供的数据，它提供了1912-2016年间举行的美国县级总统选举的选举结果。除了倾向于再分配之外，各政党在许多其他方面也存在差异。这就是为什么把重点放在左翼或右翼政党的选票份额上，会成为要求重新分配的有利代理。为了克服这个问题，我建议根据每一位政治候选人关于再分配的论述的强度对他们进行单独的分类。美国总统项目提供了一个丰富的数据库，其中包括每个参选候选人的竞选演讲和评论。

My goal in the PhD is to study whether access to new media,the Internet, has changed the demand for redistributivepolicies in the United States. The introduction of Internetundeniably has changed the way in which people interact withinformation: from merely passive actors to producers of9 / 13information. Historical evidence shows that expanding votingrights to all citizens changes the beneficiaries of publicpolicies: from the elites to the newly enfranchised voters[Larcinese (2014), Lindert (2004), Husted (1997)]. Althoughthe right to vote is virtually universal in the U.S., the Internetmay act as a form of enfranchisement, forasmuch as it givesvoice to citizens and ideas which were not paid attention bythe traditional media.The first paper in measuring reliably the causal effect of thisnew medium on the U.S. presidential elections was Larcineseet. al. (2017). They found that Internet penetration has astrong positive impact on voter turnout, with a weaker effecton campaign contributions and vote shares to Democrats.Unfortunately, evidence of Internet diffusion on politicalparticipation is mixed [Gavazza et. al. (2018), Falck et. al.(2014), Campante et. al. (2018)]. With regard to preferencestowards redistribution, Alesina et. al. (2004) pointed topotential explanations of demand for redistribution: theshare of poor population, the characteristics of the politicalsystem, culture and attitudes. Experimental evidence on thedemand for redistribution have found that its main driversare self-interest, insurance motives and social concernsrelating to inequality [Durante et. al. (2014)]. In line with this,Alesina et. al. (2005) stressed that preferences over politicalactors may reflect voters' own perceptions on the state ofthe economy and the determinants of inequality. This is themechanism in which I want to focus on.A higher amount of information may educate voters,affecting political accountability and public policy choices[Avis et. al. (2018), Prat et. al. (2013), Snyder et. al. (2010)].Nonetheless, even though the Internet undoubtedly hasincreased the amount of information accessible to individualsat a relatively low monetary cost, it might as well increasedthe cognitive and time cost of processing this huge amountof information. First of all, there is evidence that media actlike agenda setters, i.e. by covering certain topics they affectthe relative importance that consumers give to that topic[Larcinese et. al. (2011), McCombs (2004)]. Closely relatedto this fact is that, as found in Durante et. al. (2018), peoplewho is more exposed to entertainment TV are morevulnerable to populist messages. Conceivably, this evidencewill not only relate to traditional media, since the Internet hasalso increased the number of entertainment opportunities.Hence, the real threat of this new media is that it may act asecho chambers [Garret (2009), Gentzkow (2011)], amplifyingthe effects of agenda setting and vulnerability to populism.In order to measure demand for redistribution I will constructa variable capturing the share of votes that a proredistribution candidate got. To do so I will use two datasets.The first is the one provided by the Atlas of U.S. PresidentialElections, which provides electoral results for the U.S.presidential elections at the county level elections held in theperiod 1912-2016.Political parties differ on many other aspects than just theirleaning towards redistribution. That is why focusing on theshare of voting to the left or right-wing parties would be anoisy proxy for demand for redistribution. In order toovercome this problem, I propose to individually classify eachpolitical candidate based on the intensity of their discoursewith regard to redistribution. The American PresidencyProject gives access to a rich database of election speechesand remarks for each candidate running for election.