Counterfactuals, Chance and Ability

能力的概念一直是哲学关注的焦点。这尤其是因为拥有一种能力意味着什么这个问题与人类是否有自由意志的争论密切相关：我们是否有能力按照我们的选择行事，或者我们是否决定按照我们实际上所做的行事？在这个问题中，短语“能够做X”的意义和行为一直是哲学关注的主要地点之一。哲学家和语言学家目前的共识是，“A能够做X”是一个索引断言，依赖于一个特定的主体，也依赖于在断言做出时哪些背景事实是相关的。对自由意志的关注有点不幸，因为在形而上学和语言哲学的其他地方，能力概念的许多应用都被忽视了。我的研究旨在调查其中的一些其他联系。我想探讨的第一个联系是涉及“可能”的反事实主张的语义，比如“如果投掷硬币，它可能会正面朝上”。这种反事实的一种理论认为，这意味着“如果投掷硬币，它就不会正面朝上”。最初，这似乎是可以接受的，但似乎随之而来的是，如果一个“可能”反事实是真的，那么双重“将”反事实是假的。由于“可能”的说法相当弱，几乎所有“会”的反事实都是错误的，这是一个不吸引人的结果。另一种理论是，这些反事实是认识论的，意思是“据我们所知，如果扔硬币，它会正面朝上”。这与might的其他认知用法非常吻合。但掷硬币的反事实似乎是正确的，因为硬币是怎样的，而不是因为我们知道什么！我的另一个建议是，这些条件句实际上是伪装的能力归属，意思是“如果投掷硬币，它可能（将能够）落地正面”。我将研究“可能”反事实是如何工作的，以及支持一些（但不是全部）条件句的能力解释的论点：有些最好被理解为认识论。我要研究的第二个联系是偶然。许多哲学家都观察到，机会是一种分级的可能性，但我认为，如果我们把机会与能力联系起来，而不是一般的可能性联系起来，会讲述一个更好的故事。当且仅当一枚硬币能够正面落地时，它有一定机会正面落地，这似乎是合理的。我打算调查机会和能力之间的这种貌似合理的联系是否经得起推敲。机会取决于你将机会归因于哪个系统，以及基于背景假设，这与能力归属的工作方式非常相似，但还需要做更多的工作来充实这种联系。许多人认为，不平凡的机会与决定论是不相容的，这些不相容的论点是关于自由意志的类似论点的变体。在我的研究过程中，我将捍卫一种相容论：即使在决定论下，我们也可以正确地说，如果投掷一枚硬币，它能够落地，因此，如果投掷，它有机会落地。我想探讨的最后一个联系是能力和责任之间的关系。最近哈里·法兰克福提出的一个论点认为，责任并不要求责任人有可能做出与他们所做的不同的事情。但是，这是否会导致进一步的结论，即责任并不要求那些负责任的人能够做其他事情？这个问题将是我在这个领域研究的重点；我建议不要得出进一步的结论，以确保责任与不这样做的能力之间的联系。这就要求我们能够做到不可能做到的事；我打算调查一下，这是否像最初看起来那样令人不快。

The notion of ability has been the focus of considerable philosophical attention. This is particularly because the question of what it means to have an ability is closely connected to the debate over whether human beings have free will: do we have the ability to act as we choose, or are we determined to act as we in fact do? The meaning and behaviour of the phrase 'is able to do X' in this question has been one of the primary loci of philosophical attention. The current consensus, amongst philosophers and linguists, is that 'A is able to do X' is an indexical claim, dependent on a particular agent, and also dependent on which kinds of background facts are relevant at the time the claim is made. The focus on free will is slightly unfortunate, for many applications of the concept of ability elsewhere in metaphysics and philosophy of language have been overlooked. My research is intended to investigate some of these other connections.The first connection I intend to explore is with the semantics of counterfactual claims involving 'might', like 'If the coin had been tossed, it might have landed heads'. One theory of such counterfactuals suggests that this means 'it is not the case that if the coin had been tossed, it wouldn't have landed heads'. Initially this seems okay, but it appears to follow that if a 'might' counterfactual is true, the dual 'would' counterfactual is false. Since 'might' claims are quite weak, almost all 'would' counterfactuals are false, an unappealing result. The other theory is that these counterfactuals are epistemic, meaning something like 'For all we know, if the coin had been tossed it would have landed heads'. This fits well with other epistemic uses of 'might'. But the coin-tossing counterfactual seems to be true because of how the coin is, not because of what we know! My alternative proposal is that such conditionals are in fact disguised ability ascriptions, meaning 'If the coin had been tossed, it could (would have been able to) land heads'. I will investigate how 'could' counterfactuals work, as well as arguments in favour of the ability interpretation of some, but not all, such conditionals: some are best understood as epistemic.The second connection I intend to investigate is with chance. Many philosophers have observed that chance is a kind of graded possibility, but I think that a better story can be told if we connect chance, not to possibility in general, but to ability. It seems plausible that a coin has some chance of landing heads if, and only if, it is able to land heads. I intend to investigate whether this plausible connection between chance and ability withstands scrutiny. The ways that chances depend on which system one ascribes the chances to, and on background assumptions, are very reminiscent of how ability ascriptions work, but more needs to be done to flesh out the connection. Many have argued that non-trivial chances are incompatible with determinism, and these incompatibilist arguments are variants on similar arguments with respect to free will. In the course of my research I will defend a kind of compatibilism: even under determinism, it can be true to say of a coin that it is able to land heads if tossed, and thus it has a chance of landing heads if tossed.The last connection I intend to explore is the relationship between ability and responsibility. A recent argument due to Harry Frankfurt argues that responsibility does not require that it be POSSIBLE that those responsible do otherwise than they did. But does this lead to the further conclusion that responsibility does not require that those responsible be ABLE to do otherwise? This question will be the focus of my research in this area; I propose that the further conclusion does not follow, securing the connection between responsibility and the ability to do otherwise. This requires that we be able to do that which is impossible; I intend to investigate whether this is as unpalatable as it first appears.