Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition

有大量文献调查了这样一个概念，即在知识分散在不同主体的市场中，价格不仅起到分配资源的作用，还起到了传递信息的作用。代理人的预期被认为是理性的，因为他们知道价格所揭示的信息。到目前为止，几乎所有的研究都涉及竞争市场或垄断。一个主要的重点是在理性预期下，人们可以预期在这样的市场中传递的信息量。这个项目的贡献来自于研究理性预期均衡的性质，当一些代理人有足够的市场力量能够影响价格，但不存在垄断。这是一个非常困难的问题，因为传输的信息量成为一个战略选择问题。该项目阐明了不完全竞争框架下理性预期均衡的本质，并将信息披露程度与竞争模型中的信息披露程度进行了比较。

There is a large literature investigating the notion that in markets where knowledge is dispersed across different agents, prices serve not only to allocate resources but to transmit information. Agents expectations are assumed to be rational in the sense that they are aware of the information revealed by prices. Almost all work so far has concerned competitive markets or monopolies. A major emphasis has been on the amount of information that one can expect to be transmitted in such markets under rational expectations. The contribution of this project comes from investigating the nature of rational expectations equilibrium when some of the agents have sufficient market power to be able to affect prices but there is no monopoly. This is a very difficult problem because the amount of information transmitted becomes a matter of strategic choice. The project elucidates the nature of rational expectations equilibrium in such a framework of imperfect competition and compares the degree of information revelation with that in a competitive model.