Theoretical Study of the Economics of Law

在过去十年中，最重要的发展之一是 在法律的科学研究中， 和经济学。 在对这一领域作出贡献的人中， Shavell博士因其创新性的工作而备受尊敬 和生产力。 在这个项目下，Shavell博士计划 继续并扩展他的经济理论研究， 分析法律的一系列问题，其中经济原则 可以产生关于法律的规则的影响的新知识， 法律关系的性质。 将解决三个问题。 主要议题涉及 替代产权制度（专利、版权、 商标保护）。 另一种选择是 政府对知识分子的创造给予奖励 作品，然后让作品进入公有领域。 主要 专利的问题在于它们造成了垄断，因此 高于边际成本的低效率定价;另一方面， 拥有专利（或另一种奖励制度）可能会减少 私人回报创新。 理论分析将是 将注册和奖励系统与 保护财产权。 鉴于生产力， 竞争力和技术变革是重要的经济 产权转让的可能性， 智力作品可以在提高智力水平方面发挥重要作用。 美国工业的生产力和美国技术的不断提高 中求进工作总 第二个问题是调查人员先前的调查结果的延伸。 制定最佳制裁和执行成本。 了区分 将在两种类型的执行成本之间进行-固定成本 政府必须承担的责任， 个人制裁和可变或边际成本， 随着受制裁或从事 有害行为。 要探讨的基本概念是， 犯罪者还应支付被抓获的费用。 第三 问题，也是研究者以前工作的延伸， 考虑最优激励合同时，有非货币 结果。 委托代理经济模型 关系通常假设风险结果， 代理人行为的结果是金钱。 该分析将 第一百零一条当事人对标的物的请求权属于下列情形之一的，人民法院不予受理： 而不是以其他方式影响他的财富，如 为委托人的孩子或医生寻求监护权的律师 试图治愈一个病人。 这项研究将增加我们的 了解最优契约的定性方面。

During the past decade, one of the most significant developments in the scientific study of law is work at the intersection of law and economics. Among those who have contributed to this area, Dr. Shavell is among the most respected for his innovative work and productivity. Under this project, Dr. Shavell plans to continue and extend his theoretical research on the economic analysis of law to a set of problems where economic principles can generate new knowledge about the effects of legal rules and the nature of law-related relations. Three problems will be addressed. The major topic concerns an alternative to property rights regimes (patent, copyright, trademark protection) in intellectual works. The alternative is for the government to give rewards for creation of intellectual works and then have the works enter the public domain. The main problem with patents is that they create a monopoly, and hence inefficient pricing above marginal cost; on the other side, not having patents (or another system of reward) may reduce the private returns to innovation. A theoretical analysis will be made of how the registry and reward system compares to a system of protection of property rights. Given that productivity, competitiveness, and technological change are important economic issues, the possibility of assignment of property rights for intellectual works can play an important role in improving productivity of American industry and increasing U.S. technical progress. The second problem is an extension of the investigator's previous work on optimal sanctions and enforcement costs. A distinction will be made between two types of enforcement costs--fixed costs that the government must bear regardless of the number of individuals sanctioned and variable or marginal costs which increase with the number of individuals sanctioned or engaging in harmful acts. The essential idea to be explored is whether the offender should also pay for the cost of being caught. The third problem, also an extension of the investigator's previous work, considers optimal incentive contracts when there are non-monetary outcomes. The economic model of the principal and agent relationship generally assumes that the risky outcome that results from the agent's action is monetary. This analysis will pertain to the case in which the outcome affects the principal's utility in a way other than by affecting his wealth, such as a lawyer seeking custody for a client's children or a physician seeking to cure a patient. This study should increase our understanding about the qualitative aspects of optimal contracts.