Renegotiation and Bargaining in Dynamic Games

该项目涉及一个被忽视但至关重要的研究领域 在战略动力学理论中，重新谈判 重复的游戏 更新和议价能力相结合 一个统一的、连贯的理论。 该项目的大部分内容都与 提供清晰的特征，使理论 在应用经济问题上易处理的。 无论是制定 适当的定义和表征变成 随着越来越复杂的超级游戏越来越具有挑战性， 研究了 该项目给出了定义和验证结果 对于非对称的严格重复博弈和一些动态的， 随机博弈 这是一项极其重要的研究，因为它纠正了一个主要的 重复博弈模型和重复博弈模型的缺陷， 广泛应用于宏观理论、产业组织、 国际贸易和许多其他领域的经济理论。 的 重复博弈模型的有效性取决于 玩家达成的协议。 如果玩家认为他们可以 通过重新谈判来逃避违反协议的惩罚， 当他们违反协议后，他们不再有一个 鼓励遵守协议。 因此， 没有重新谈判理论的重复博弈是有缺陷的 因为许多不同的结果，除了一个商定的， 是可能的。

This project addresses a neglected but crucial area of research in the theory of strategic dynamics, i.e., renegotiation in repeated games. Renegotiation and bargaining power are combined in a unified, coherent theory. Much of the project is concerned with providing clean characterizations which make the theory tractable in applied economic problems. Both the formulation of the appropriate definitions and the characterizations become progressively more challenging as more complicated supergames are studied. The project gives definitions and conjectured results for asymmetric strictly repeated games and for some dynamic and stochastic games. This is extremely important research because it corrects a major flaw in models of repeated games and repeated game models are widely used in macro theory, industrial organization, international trade and many other areas of economic theory. The validity of repeated game models depend on the credibility of the agreements reached by the players. If players think they can escape punishment for violating agreements by renegotiating the agreement after they violate it, then they no longer have an incentive to abide by the agreements. Therefore, a model of repeated games without a theory of renegotiation is flawed because many different outcomes other than the one agreed upon are possible.