The Evolution of Optimizing Behavior and of Attitudes Toward Risk

这个项目与进化博弈论有关。它有两个目标：探索优化行为和对风险态度的演变。经济学中的一个基本假设是代理人最优化。这个项目通过询问进化(和其他动态)力量是否会导致非优化行为的灭绝来检验这一假设。特别是，作者将寻找进化力量确实选择优化行为的条件；他们还将探索哪些形式的非优化行为仍然存在(在看似合理但不足以保证非优化行为灭绝的环境中)。更具体地说，将调查学习和进化力量在选择规则而不是策略方面的相互作用。关于对风险态度的演变，重要的是要知道什么形式的战略互动导致对风险的什么态度。例如，众所周知，赢家通吃的游戏会导致冒险行为。这将有助于调查，例如，什么形式的市场互动将导致过度冒险行为。这项研究很重要，因为它将提高我们对优化行为的演变和对风险的态度的理解。

This project is concerned with evolutionary game theory. It has two objectives: to explore the evolution of optimizing behavior and of attitudes toward risk. A basic presumption in economics is that agents optimize. This project examines this presumption by asking whether evolutionary (and other dynamic) forces will lead to the extinction of non-optimizing behavior. In particular, the authors will search for conditions under which evolutionary forces do select for optimizing behavior; and they will also explore what form of non-optimizing behavior does survive (in environments which are plausible but not sufficient to guarantee the extinction of non-optimizing behavior). More specifically, the interaction of learning and evolutionary forces in the selection of rules rather than strategies will be investigated. With regards to the evolution of attitudes towards risk it is important to know what forms of strategic interaction lead to what attitudes towards risk. For example, it is known that winner-takes-all games lead to risking-taking behavior. This will be useful for investigating, for instance, what forms of market interaction will lead to excessive risk taking behavior. This research is important because it will improve our understanding of the evolution of optimizing behavior and of attitudes toward risk.