Sequential Voting Models

项目摘要本方案包括两个部分。第一部分也是主要部分是与Michele Piccione的合作。投票模型是最近政治经济学研究的基础。在投票模型中，投票可以扮演两个角色：它可以汇总私人信息和/或偏好。而在大多数投票模型中，选民对每个问题同时投票，我们分析顺序投票博弈。这使得解决关于投票的两个角色的许多有趣的问题成为可能。例如，关于聚合信息，哪种机制更好：同步投票还是顺序投票？当选民可以选择何时投票时，他们会选择一种有效的信息聚合方法吗？我们还研究了提前或推迟投票的两种相反考虑因素的影响：提前的选民更有可能确定一组“相关”的选择，而晚些的选民将知道哪些选择是相关的，因此不太可能“浪费”他们的选票。当选民可以选择何时投票时，会出现什么顺序结构？期望有相似偏好的选民会选择近距离投票还是远距离投票？该项目解决了在考虑顺序投票环境时产生的这些问题和其他问题。这揭示了各州在初选时间上“玩游戏”的含义，或者在其他地区投票结束之前宣布一些地区的投票结果的含义。第二部分包含两个关于博弈论基础的项目（但它们在其他方面是不相关的）。第一个是与巴特·利普曼（Bart Lipman）和阿尔多·鲁斯蒂奇尼（Aldo Rustichini）合作，为克雷普斯*提出的不可预见的偶然性模型推导出独特的主观概率，并由我们三人在早期的工作中进一步扩展。第二个是与Drew Fudenberg和David Levine合作，为不完全信息的游戏开发了基于学习的解决方案概念，如自我确认平衡的概念，并且也包含了理性。* D。M. Kreps(1979)：“弹性偏好的表示定理”，《计量经济学》47 565 - 576。

Project Abstract The proposal contains two parts. The first and main part is joint work with Michele Piccione. In voting models, which underlie much recent research in political economy, the voting can have two roles: it can aggregate private information and / or preferences. Whereas in most voting models the electorate votes simultaneously on each issue, we analyze sequential voting games. This makes it possible to address many interesting questions on both roles of voting. For example, concerning aggregating information, which mechanism is better: simultaneous or sequential voting? When the electorate can choose when to vote, will they choose a method that is efficient for aggregating information? We also study the implications of two opposing considerations in voting earlier or later: early voters are more likely to determine the set of `relevant` alternatives and later voters will know which alternatives are relevant and hence are less likely to `waste` their vote. What sequential structures will then occur when voters can chose when to vote? Will voters who expect to have similar preferences choose to vote close together or far apart in time? The project addresses these and other questions that arise from considering sequential voting environments. This sheds light on the implications of states `gaming` on when to have their primaries, or of announcing the outcomes of votes in some districts before voting is completed in others. The second part contains two projects on the foundations of game theory (but that are otherwise unrelated). The first, joint with Bart Lipman and Aldo Rustichini, derives unique subjective probabilities for the model of unforeseen contingencies proposed by Kreps* and further extended by the three of us in earlier work. The second, joint with Drew Fudenberg and David Levine, develops, for games of incomplete information, solution concepts that are based on learning, such as the notion of self-confirming equilibria, and that incorporate rationality as well. *D. M. Kreps (1979): `A Representation Theorem for 'Preference for Flexibility',` Econometrica 47 565 - 576.