Bargaining and Power in Ongoing Relationships

在国际关系领域内，安全研究和国际政治经济学的子领域在很大程度上仍然彼此孤立。这个项目发展了一种更连贯和通用的方式来看待无政府状态下的政治讨价还价——无论是与安全研究或国际政治经济学（或国内政治）相关的问题。为了实现这一目标，研究者发表了一系列论文，研究放松目前在安全研究建模中定义最新技术的关键假设的影响。最近国际关系理论方面的正式工作的局限性在于，它通常把权力的行使建模为一种一劳永逸的决定。正式地说，这些分析中使用的游戏通常在任何玩家试图通过战争或更广泛地说，通过强加解决方案来行使权力时结束。一个相关的，但迄今为止未被强调的限制是，在经济学和国际关系理论中，许多讨价还价游戏也会在一方接受提议时结束。因此，任何讨价还价者都不能违背要约或协议，即使它想这样做，因为游戏树不允许这样做。从某种意义上说，这些游戏违反了无政府状态的假设，因为它们隐含地允许讨价还价者承诺履行自己的提议。本研究从两个方面研究放松这些限制的效果。首先，谈判者可以违背他们的提议。碰巧的是，这个源于国际关系理论的新假设，为现代议价理论中的一个核心难题提供了一个自然的答案。在20世纪80年代后期，议价理论家期望不完全信息的存在可以解释为什么议价会有延迟，即为什么议价者通常需要很长时间才能达成协议。但是，这些预期在标准模型中被证明是不正确的。即使信息不完整，也没有延误。令人惊讶的是，延迟似乎确实是不完整信息的直接后果，一旦玩家也可以食言。其次，这个项目放松了使用权力是一种游戏结束策略的假设。这个问题的一个方面是将权力的行使建模为一系列更明确的相互作用的决策。这里的重点是这一过程的预期结果如何影响在权力开始行使之前发生的讨价还价。第二个方面关注的是这样一个事实，即权力的行使很少会消除行动者。在明确行使权力结束后，战略互动往往会继续。而且，一旦以这种方式看待权力的使用，一个共同的战略问题就会成为安全事务、国际政治经济和国内政治中许多问题的基础。本研究对这一问题进行了定性，并分析了其中议价与权力的关系。

Within the field of international relations, the subfields of security studies and international political economy remain largely isolated from each other. This project develops a more coherent and general way of looking at political bargaining in anarchy - be it over issues typically associated with security studies or international political economy (or domestic politics). To achieve this end, the investigator produces a series of papers that study the effects of relaxing key assumptions that currently define the state-of-the-art in the modeling of security studies.The limitations of the much recent formal work in international relations theory is that it generally models the exercise of power as a once-and-for-all decision. Formally, the games used in these analyses usually end as soon as any player attempts to exercise power by going to war or, more broadly, by imposing a settlement.A related, but heretofore unemphasized limitation is that many bargaining games in both economics and international relation's theory also end as soon as one of the players accepts an offer. Thus no bargainer can renege on an offer or an agreement even if it would like to, because the game tree does not allow for it. In a sense then, these games violate the assumption of anarchy in that they implicitly allow a bargainer to commit itself to honoring its offers.This research studies the effects of relaxing these limitations in two ways. First, the bargainers are able to renege on their offers. As it happens, this new assumption, which grows out of international relations theory, provides a natural answer to a central puzzle in modern bargaining theory. In the late 1980s, bargaining theorists expected that the presence of incomplete information would explain why there is delay in bargaining, i.e., why bargainers often take a long time to reach an agreement. But, these expectations proved incorrect in the standard models. Even with incomplete information, there was no delay. Surprisingly, delay does seem to be a direct consequence of incomplete information once the players can also renege.Second, this project relaxes the assumption that the use of power is a game-ending strategy. One facet of this problem models the exercise of power as a more explicit series of interacting decisions. The focus here is on how the expected outcomes of this process shapes the bargaining that occurs before the exercise of power begins.A second facet focuses on the fact that the exercise of power rarely eliminates actors. Strategic interaction often continues after the explicit exercise of power has ended. And, once the use of power is viewed in this way, a common strategic problem appears t underlie many problems in security affairs, international political economy, and domestic politics. This research characterizes this problem and analyzes the relation between bargaining and power in it.