Economic Voting in Volatile Contexts: National and Sub-national Politics in Latin America.

拟议的研究通过将重点放在较新的民主国家和不太稳定的经济背景上，探索经济投票文献的更广泛的比较相关性。这项研究利用个人和总体层面的数据，测试了拉丁美洲三个主要国家的国家和地方各级政府的经济投票假设。核心的工作假设是，拉丁美洲的选民对宏观经济波动很敏感，并相应地惩罚或奖励政府，但经济投票的倾向因宏观经济背景和制度条件而异。拟议研究项目的几个组成部分旨在促进关于经济投票的理论工作，加强我们对民主在当代拉丁美洲国家和国家以下各级的运作的了解，并为理解政党竞争结构的变化和宏观经济波动影响政治行为的方式奠定更坚实的理论基础。

The proposed research explores the broader comparative relevance of the literature on economic voting by moving outside of the North Atlantic basin to focus on newer democracies and less stable economic contexts. Drawing on both individual- and aggregate-level data, the research tests hypotheses about economic voting at the national and sub-national levels of government in three major countries of Latin America. The central working hypothesis is that voters in Latin America are sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations and punish or reward governments accordingly, but that the propensity toward economic voting varies with macroeconomic context and institutional conditions. The several components of the proposed research project are designed to contribute to theoretical work on economic voting, enhance our understanding of the functioning of democracy at both the national and sub-national level in contemporary Latin America, and establish a stronger theoretical basis for understanding the ways in which variations in the structure of party competition and macroeconomic volatility condition political behavior.