The Effects of Institutional Transformation on Corruption in Indonesia

摘要提案编号：0416840美国国家科学基金会项目：经济学机构：美国国家经济研究局/布朗大学首席研究员：Henderson， Vernon j提案题目：制度转型对印尼腐败的影响腐败已经成为阻碍大部分发展中国家经济增长和发展的主要问题之一。迄今为止，所有关于腐败原因的研究都依赖于汇总数据，主要是国家一级的数据。本研究将收集和分析原始数据，以及印尼企业腐败的性质和成本，以及公共部门转型在影响腐败方面的作用。印尼的腐败现象普遍且代价高昂。虽然“有效油脂假说”认为贿赂促进了商业运作，但这项研究认为，随着腐败，公职人员增加了法规或“骚扰”的数量，以创造更多的受贿机会。印度尼西亚为研究机构改革对腐败的影响提供了一个不寻常的机会，原因有二，最重要的是最近公共部门的大规模转型。大多数腐败涉及与地方官员的互动，他们负责管理法规和税收。在2001年之前，这些官员在一个单一的系统中运作，并由中央任命。2001年初，印度尼西亚实行了有效的联邦制，将地方公共服务的责任转移到地方县，即kabupaten政府。权力下放和地方民主化被视为通过地方政治竞争和司法管辖区间对公司的竞争来遏制腐败的途径。其次，有一个基线调查，记录了权力下放时期腐败的程度和形式。这项研究将调查一些原有的公司以及新的公司，以评估制度变革对腐败的影响，并收集有关腐败和公司的更详细的信息。人们对导致腐败的企业和官员之间相互作用的性质知之甚少。哪些类型的公共法规和税收会导致贿赂？每种类型的重要性有多大？在贿赂过程中，官员需要缴纳的税款和执照费、为减少这些费用而行贿的费用以及讨好当地官员所花费的时间之间的权衡是什么？不同公司的反应有多不同？一些腐败涉及对国家收入的欺诈。但是，地方官员收到的预期贿赂被转化为较低的官员工资，实际上代表了“税收”。通过从战略意义上研究二者之间的关系，PI为发展中国家的受贿问题提供了很好的分析框架。收集到的数据将对其他研究人员非常有用

ABSTRACTProposal Number: 0416840NSF Program: ECONOMICSInstitution: NBER/Brown UniversityPrincipal Investigator: Henderson, Vernon JProposal Title: The Effects of Institutional Transformation on Corruption in IndonesiaCorruption has been one of the major problems hampering economic growth and development in a large part of the developing world. To date, all research on the causes of corruption have relied on aggregate data, mostly at the national level. This research will collect and analyze original data and the nature and costs of corruption to businesses in Indonesia and the role of public sector transformation in influencing corruption. Corruption in Indonesia is widespread and costly. While the "efficient grease hypothesis," argues that bribes facilitate business operations, this research argues that, with corruption, public officials increase the numbers of regulations, or "harassment," in order to generate more opportunities to collect bribes. Indonesia represents an unusual opportunity to study the impact of institutional reform on corruption for two reasons, the most important being the recent wholesale transformation of the public sector.Most corruption involves interaction with local officials, who administer regulations and taxation. Before 2001, these officials operated in a unitary system, and were appointed by the center. In early 2001, Indonesia effectively federalized, shifting responsibilities for local public services to the local county, or kabupatengovernment. Decentralization and local democratization were seen as ways to curb corruption through the local political competition and of inter-jurisdictional competition for firms. Secondly, there is a base line survey that documents the extent and forms of corruption at the time of decentralization. This research will survey a number of the original firms as well as new ones, to assess the impacts of the institutional change on corruption and to gather more detailed information on corruption and firms.There is very little known about the nature of the interaction between firms and officials that leads to corruption. What types of public regulations and taxation invite bribes and how important is each type? In the bribing process, what are thetrade-offs among official required payments for taxes and licenses, bribes to reduce these payments, and time spent wooing local officials? How heterogeneous are responses across firms? Some corruption involves defraud of the state of revenues. But expected bribes received by local officials are capitalized into lowerofficial salaries, and represent de facto "taxation". By studying the relationship in a strategic sense, the PI brings very good analytical framework to the issue of bribe taking in developing countries. The data collected will be of enormous use to other researchers