Studies on Dynamic Markets: Small Change and Big Impact

科斯猜想认为，如果耐用品垄断者频繁地操纵市场，那么耐用品必须以接近竞争市场水平的价格出售，市场结果几乎是有效的。 为了使分析易于处理，假设货物是完全不易腐烂的，假设如果货物缓慢腐烂，模型的结果不会受到严重影响。 第一个项目通过严格调查易腐耐用品交易的动态垄断问题来挑战这一看似合理的假设。 如果耐用品腐烂，不管腐烂的速度有多慢，市场结果都与经典的耐用品不腐烂的模型有根本的不同。 特别是，市场结果是典型的无效率的，即使是一个小的承诺力量可以产生一个大的市场力量，使垄断者几乎可以实现静态垄断利润，即使他非常频繁地操作市场。 因此，传统的强制垄断者频繁向消费者销售商品的管制政策并不像科斯猜想所指出的那样有效。电力的市场价格远高于边际生产成本，波动极大，这被普遍认为是市场功能失调的证据。 根本问题是，市场结果的这些据称不受欢迎的特征是否确实与没有参与者行使市场权力的竞争性市场不一致。 由于发电量受到严格的斜坡限制，第二个项目研究了供应方摩擦的市场，其中供应不能立即增加以应对需求的突然增加。 传统观点认为，如果摩擦很小，那么市场价格应该徘徊在边际生产成本附近。 严格的分析表明，情况并非如此。 无论供应摩擦有多小，市场价格都在窒息价格和0之间跳跃，没有向边际生产成本收敛的趋势。 然而，市场结果是有效的。 交易收益的分配可能会非常倾斜，使供应商能够获得巨额利润。 因此，市场的效率并没有否定市场价格的波动性和高于边际成本的市场价格，成功完成项目的好处既实际又广泛。 第一个项目说明了改革传统反竞争政策的必要性。 对问题的严格分析为设计新政策提供了许多有用的线索。 第二个项目揭示了需要一种全新的方法来评估放松管制的市场的绩效，并诊断在动态竞争市场与供应摩擦的战略操纵。 与此同时，它警告政府不要采取一系列抑制波动的措施，因为这样做可能会破坏市场的效率。 它指出了利用现货市场配置资源的利弊，同时挑战了公用事业行业放松管制背后的传统智慧。

The Coase conjecture says that if the durable good monopolist operates the market frequently, the good must be sold at a price close to the competitive market level and the market outcome becomes almost efficient. To make the analysis tractable, the goods are assumed to be perfectly non-perishable, under the presumption that the outcome of the model is not critically affected if the good decays slowly. The first project challenges this seemingly plausible assumption by rigorously investigating the dynamic monopoly problem where perishable durable goods are traded. If the durable good decays, no matter how slowly, the market outcome is fundamentally different from the classic durable good models without decay. In particular, the market outcome is typically inefficient and even a small commitment power can generate a large market power so that the monopolist can almost achieve the static monopolistic profit even if he operates the market very frequently. Thus, the traditional regulatory policy to force the monopolist to sell goods to consumers frequently is not as effective as indicated by the Coase conjecture.It is generally perceived as an evidence of market dysfunction that the market price of power is extremely volatile, which stays well above the marginal production cost. The fundamental question is whether these allegedly undesirable features of the market outcomes are indeed inconsistent with the competitive market in which no player exercises market power. Motivated by the fact that the electric power generation is subject to a tight ramping constraint, the second project examines the market with supply side friction where the supply cannot increase instantaneously in response to a sudden increase in demand. The conventional wisdom is that if the friction is small, then the market price should hover around the marginal production cost. Rigorous analysis shows otherwise. No matter how small the supply friction may be, the market price is jumping between the choke-up price and 0, with no tendency to converge to the marginal production cost. Yet, the market outcome is efficient. The distribution of the gains from trading can be extremely skewed, allowing the supplier to rake a large profit. Thus, the volatility and the market price higher than the marginal cost are implied rather than refuted by the efficiency of the market.The benefit from a successful completion of the projects is both practical and broad. The first project illuminates the need for reforming the traditional policy against the anti-competitive behavior. The rigorous analysis of the problem provides a number of useful leads to design a new policy. The second project reveals the need for completely new approach for evaluating the performance of the deregulated market and diagnosing the strategic manipulation in dynamic competitive market with supply friction. At the same time, it warns against a series of attempts by the government to dampen the volatility, because doing so may undermine the efficiency of the market. It points out the pros and cons of using the spot market to allocate resources, while challenging the conventional wisdom behind the utility industry deregulations.