Topics in Dynamics and Political Economy

该奖项资助两个独立项目的工作。 第一个项目开发动态博弈论的新方法。 PI的工作是将马尔可夫完美均衡的定义扩展到不完全可观察行为的情况。 他还使用了进化稳定性的概念，以检查它是否将被证明是一个强大的方法，锐化重复博弈理论的能力，使坚定的预测。第二个项目解决的问题，在政治经济学理论，再次使用的技术和方法从博弈论。 该研究描述了什么样的投票规则满足四个关键标准（匿名性，中立性，帕累托属性和策略证明），以最广泛的选民偏好。 这个项目展示了在选举制度中什么样的投票规则是最可取的。 此外，PI还建立和分析了立法谈判的模型。该项目的更广泛影响包括为社会科学、计算机科学和生物学中使用博弈论作为基本方法的许多不同社区开发新方法。 政治经济学方面的工作将有助于那些设想选举制度改革的人。

This award funds work on two separate projects. The first project develops new methods in dynamic game theory. The PI works to extend the definition of Markov perfect equilibrium to the case of imperfectly observable actions. He also uses the concept of evolutionary stability to examine whether it will prove to be a powerful method for sharpening the ability of the theory of repeated games to make firm predictions.The second project addresses issues in the theory of political economy, again by using techniques and methods from game theory. The research characterizes what voting rules satisfy four key criteria (anonymity, neutrality, the Pareto property, and strategy proofness) for the widest possible set of voter preferences. This project shows what voting rules are most preferable in electoral systems. In addition, the PI builds and analyzes a model of legislative bargaining.The broader impacts of this project include developing new methods for the many different communities in social science, computer science, and biology that use game theory as a fundamental method. The work in political economy will be helpful to those envisioning reform of electoral systems.