TWC: TTP Option: Small: Open-Audit Voting Systems---Protocol Models and Properties

开放审计的加密投票协议能够验证选举结果，而不受选举官员或投票机是否诚实的影响。许多公开审计投票系统已经原型化并部署。马里兰州塔科马公园市在2009年和2011年举行了城市选举，使用了投票系统scanintegrity。类似的系统也被提议用于澳大利亚的维多利亚州（Pret a Voter系统）和德克萨斯州的特拉维斯县（STAR-Vote系统）。本项目对现场投票协议的性质——特别是扫描完整性、Pret a Voter和STAR-Vote协议——得到了严格的结果。它进一步研究了面对面协议类的属性以及它们实现理想属性的限制。因此，它提高了我们对实际政府选举中使用的投票系统安全特性的理解。该项目提出了新的协议，其中选民和虚拟观察员使用不受信任的计算助手的对等网络来改进协议属性。它为开发公开审计投票系统提供了一个软件库。

Open-audit cryptographic voting protocols enable the verification of election outcomes, independent of whether election officials or polling machines behave honestly. Many open-audit voting systems have been prototyped and deployed. The City of Takoma Park, MD held its 2009 and 2011 city elections using voting system Scantegrity. Systems with similar properties are being proposed for use in Victoria, Australia (the Pret a Voter system) and Travis County, Texas (the STAR-Vote system). This project obtains rigorous results on the properties of in-person voting protocols'-in particular the Scantegrity, Pret a Voter and STAR-Vote protocols. It further examines the properties of classes of in-person protocols and the limits to their achievement of desirable properties. It thus improves our understanding of the security properties of voting systems that are being used in real governmental elections.The project proposes new protocols where voters and virtual observers use a peer network of untrusted computational assistants to improve protocol properties. It provides a software library for the development of open-audit voting systems.