A game-theoretic and institutional anlysis of moral hazards and social dilemmas: the case of behavioural food risks and white-collar crime in agri-food chains

生产中的不当行为需要采用不可接受的技术程序，并增加对贸易伙伴和社会产生不利结果的风险。经济关系中的行为风险源尽管具有物理影响，但被称为道德风险。它们可以被视为社会困境，其根源是违反旨在防止这些困境的规则所造成的负面外部性。不当行为的可能性随着误导的经济激励而增加，即它能够产生的预期利润。它随着规范的束缚而减少，这些规范防止生产者屈服于经济诱惑。尽管越来越多的社会意识，很少有研究已经做了在食品生产环境的特点是不对称的信息和利益冲突的情况下，遵守和违反规则的行为。因此，在决策过程以及确定和遏制行为性食品风险方面，仍然存在巨大的知识差距。该项目旨在评估如何将对行为者的激励措施的微观经济实证分析与对体制环境的分析相结合，从而有助于理解食品企业的决策以及体制环境的形成和变化。

Malpractice in production entails unacceptable technological procedures and increased risks of adverse outcomes for trading partners and the society. Despite their physical implications, behavioural risk sources in economic relationships are known as moral hazards. They can be seen as social dilemmas originating from negative externalities caused by the breaking of rules designed to prevent them. The probability of malpractice increases with misdirected economic incentives, i.e. the expected profit it is able to produce. It decreases with bonds to norms that prevent producers from giving way to economic temptations. Despite a growing societal awareness, little research has been done on the conditions of ruleabiding and rule-breaking behaviour in food production contexts characterised by asymmetric information and conflicting interests. Consequently, large knowledge gaps persist on decisionmaking processes and on identifying and curbing behavioural food risks. The project aims to assess how a microeconomic empirical analysis of the actors' incentives can be combined with an analysis of institutional environments, thus contributing to the understanding of decisionmaking in food businesses and of the making and changing of institutional environments.