Analysis of Compensation Structures and the Transformation of the Japanese Firm Using the Matched Personnel and Employee Survey Data

本研究使用人事数据和员工调查结果，对日本制造业企业实施的基于绩效的人力资源制度改革和雇佣调整的结果进行了分析。分析结果主要有两点：第一，人力资源制度改革对员工的工作努力产生了好坏参半的影响。技能等级制度逐渐产生了以资历为导向的偏见，例如自动升级和非管理雇员在非管理级别的最高层堆积。该公司于2000年引入了工作等级制度，以科普这些问题。在从技能等级制度向职务等级制度的过渡中，公司系统地对人员进行了重新定级。使用与人事数据相匹配的调查结果，重新定级对工作努力的影响进行了估计。研究结果表明，虽然晋升的管理者提高了他们的工作努力，但其他员工的工作努力却下降了。第二，采用买断框架的雇佣调整会引起“逆向选择”。“将1993年和1996年接受买断的雇员的业绩评级与自愿留下来或离开的雇员的业绩评级进行比较。就1993年的买断而言，虽然接受买断者的技能等级较高，但他们的业绩评级与在职者相同，低于自愿离职者。因此，收购者是公司想要解雇的人。在1996年的买断中，虽然对经理人来说，买断者的业绩评级与在职者相同，但对非管理层、级别较低的买断者的评级高于在职者，与自愿离职者的评级相同。因此，非管理层收购者是公司更愿意保留的人。尽管该公司努力确保留住有价值的员工，但无法具体说明谁接受了买断。

This research examines the outcomes of the performance-based HR system reform and employment adjustments in a Japanese manufacturing company, using the personnel data and the employee survey results. The analysis reveals two main findings.First, the HR system reform has generated mixed effects on the work effort of employees. The skill grade system had gradually produced seniority-oriented bias, such as automatic upgrading and the pileup of non-managerial employees at the top tier of non-managerial ranks. The company introduced the job grade system in 2000 to cope with those problems. In the transition from the skill grade to the job grade system, the company systematically re-graded people. Using the survey results matched with the personnel data, the impact of the re-grading on the work effort was estimated. The results show that although up-graded managers improved their work effort, the rest of employees experienced the decline of work effort.Second, employment adjustment using a buyout framework invites "adverse selection." Performance ratings for employees who accepted buyouts in 1993 and 1996 are compared with those of employees who remained or left voluntarily. For the 1993 buyout, while the skill grade level of buyout takers are relatively high, their performance ratings are the same as those of incumbents and lower than those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the buyout takers were those whom the company wanted to dismiss. For the 1996 buyout, although performance ratings of buyout takers were the same as those of incumbents in the case of managers, the ratings of non-managerial, lower ranked buyout takers were higher than those of incumbents and the same as those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the non-managerial buyout takers were those whom the company would have preferred to retain. The company was unable to specify who took buyouts despite efforts to ensure retention of valued employees.