Game theoretical analysis of cooperation and social development : institution, organization and negotiations

寻求自身私人目标的经济行为人如何才能实现合作并发展长期合作关系？我们的研究认为，这些问题的社会合作，采用博弈论的方法。特别是，我们的分析重点关注经济主体试图通过谈判、组织和制度安排实现自愿合作的情况。为了在个体推理和决策的微观层面上分析这些问题，我们应用了博弈论的新发展，如博弈均衡理论，进化和学习理论，以及博弈实验。主要结果如下。(1)合作与发展的动态博弈分析本文提出了一个动态博弈模型，该模型基于一个世代不重叠的n人囚徒困境，描述了代理人的战略行为、组织形成和社会发展。我们考虑如何通过建立合作组织来促进社会发展。(2)群体形成和收益分布的谈判博弈：理论与实验我们建立了群体形成和收益分布的非合作谈判博弈模型。我们还在日本和奥地利进行了讨价还价的实验，以测试我们的理论预测。主要的实验证据是，负互惠（拒绝不公平的报价）是至关重要的主体的行为，以及货币收益最大化。(3)经济应用我们将理论结果应用于几个实证问题，包括社会间接资本的积累和全球变暖问题，并考虑结果的政策含义。

How can economic agents seeking their own private goals attain cooperation and develop their cooperative relationships in the long run? Our research considers these problems of social cooperation by employing game theoretical methodologies. In particular, our analysis is focused on situations where economic agents attempt to realize voluntary cooperation through negotiations, organization, and institutional arrangements. To analyze these problems on micro-levels of individual reasoning and decision-making, we apply new developments of game theory such as game equilibrium theory, evolution and learning theory, and game experiments. The main results are as follows.(1) Dynamic game analysis of cooperation and developmentsWe present a dynamic game model, based on an n-person prisoners' dilemma with non-overlapping generations, which describes agents' strategic behavior, organization formation, and social developments. We consider how social developments can be promoted through the formation of organizations for cooperation.(2) Bargaining games for group formation and payoff distributions : theory and experiments We develop non-cooperative bargaining game models for group formation and payoff distributions. We also conduct bargaining experiments in Japan and Austria to test our theoretical predictions. The main experimental evidence is that negative reciprocity (rejecting unfair offers) is critical to subjects' behavior as well as monetary payoffs maximization.(3) Economic applicationsWe apply theoretical results to several empirical problems including the accumulation of social overhead capitals and global warming problems, and consider policy implications of the results.