Analysis of a Coalition from Several Angles : a Foundational Research of Cooperative Game Theory

本文将联盟作为合作博弈理论中的核心概念，比较了几种约束条件下的联盟契约模式。基于理论分析为主，但通过实验和案例研究的补充，我们证实，这是一个必要的因素，以填补合作和非合作分析之间的差距差距。特别是，我们通过几项分析证实，对重新分配和协调行动的限制，以及这种协议的有效期限和信息的收入和其他动态问题的重要性。

We consider coalitions as the key concept in the cooperative game theory, and compare the patterns of coaitional contracts under severalconstraints. Based chieifly on theoretical analysis but augmented by experimental and case studies, we confirmed that this is one factor necessary to fill the gap between cooperative and non-cooperative analysis. Especially, we verified through several analyses that constraints on reallocation and coordination of actions as well as effective duration of such agreement and incometeness of information and other dynamic issues matter.