A Comparative Study of Theory of Perception in Indian Buddhist Epistemology and Analytical Philosophy

本文通过对达摩吉提的《般若三世》(448-459)和罗纳基里特的《观音菩萨》的文本分析，阐明了佛教知觉理论中理解外物、心象和自我意识之间的情结的途径，以及概念结构(vikalpa/Kalpana)或知觉判断(Adhyavasaya)在持有虚假心像认知(Alikakaravada)和持有真实心像认知(Stiyakaravada)的观点之争中所起的作用。尽管后一个问题可能与W·塞拉斯被称为“给定的神话”的论点有关，该论点质疑心理意象是否是命题的，但不应忽视的是，印度的认识论假定了与其自身的存在论相联系的某种合理性，但与感觉数据不同，印度认识论并不将心理意象视为经验知识的基础。

On the basis of text-analysis of Dharmakirti's Pramanavarttika III 448-459 and Ratnakirit's Citradvaitaprakasavada, the present study has clarified a way for understanding the complex among external objects, mental images, and self-awareness in the Buddhist theory of perception, and the role of conceptual constructions (vikalpa/kalpana) or perceptual judgments (adhyavasaya) discussed in the controversy between the views holding cognition with false mental images (alikakaravada) and cognition with true mental images (satyakaravvada). Although the latter problem might be connected with W. Sellars's argument known as "Myth of Given," which questions whether mental images are propositional or not, it should not be overlooked that Indian epistemology that presupposes a certain rationality connected with its own soteriology does not regard the mental images, unlike sense data, as the foundation of empirical knowledge.