The application of 'fundamental rights and duties' of states to cyber operations

本文将研究国际法在国与国网络行动中的应用，以确定此类行动是否构成违反国际法并因此引起责任。主要规则的考虑范围将限于讨论所谓的“国家的基本权利”，即国家地位固有的权利，或者一个国家凭借其作为一个国家而拥有的权利理论，而不是只有在国家签订合同后才存在的权利。从这个意义上说，国家固有的权利是基本的因为它们是基础的，来自于国家的基础。本文的目的是将国际法规则的解释和应用锚定在实际情况下的网络行动中，包括假设的和真实的。基本权利和义务的理论没有确切的识别或区分，尽管“普遍接受的……”“共同核心”涉及国家的独立、主权、平等和自我保护。本文将探讨主权、不干涉和自决原则及其在网络作战中的适用性。本文希望利用对非网络环境下适用规则的深刻理解和当前国家实践，挑战一些国家和作者对这些规则的更具体解释的基础。本文解决了文献中的这些不足之处，并补充了现有的关于国际法在网络作战中的应用的研究。现代发展，包括非国家行为体在网络行动中的作用日益增强，提出了解释主要规则以适用于新行动领域的困难问题，鉴于这些挑战，这些规则仍未得到充分探索，并且在现有文献中没有得到充分关注。具体而言，本文在案例研究和假设情景的支持下，根据国家立场和现有国家实践对主要规则的解释进行了批判性分析，以提供对网络行动的最新主要规则的详细评估。这项研究与EPSRC的“全球不确定性”战略和研究领域最为一致。没有公司或合作者参与这项研究。

This thesis will examine the application of international law to state-to-state cyber operations to determine whether such operations constitute a breach of international law and thus attract responsibility. The scope of consideration of primary rules will be limited to discussion of the so-called 'fundamental rights of states', that is, rights that are inherent in statehood, or the theory of rights that a state possesses by virtue of being a state alone, and not rights that exist only once the state has contracted for them. In that sense, the rights that inhere in statehood are fundamental because they are foundational, emerging from the foundation of the state. The thesis will aim to anchor the interpretation and application of rules of international law to cyber operations in practical case scenarios, both hypothetical and real.The theory of fundamental rights and duties has no exact identification or distinction, though the 'generally accepted... common core' relate to independence, sovereignty, equality and the self-preservation of states. The thesis will examine the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and self-determination and their applicability to cyber operations. The thesis hopes to draw on a deep understanding of the applicable rules in a non-cyber context and current state practice to challenge the basis of more specific interpretations of those rules to cyber operations asserted by some states and authors.This thesis addresses these deficiencies in the literature and complements existing research on the application of international law to cyber operations. Modern developments including the increased role of non-state actors enabled by advances in technology in cyber operations raise difficult issues of interpreting primary rules to apply to a new area of operations that remain insufficiently explored in light of these challenges and has not been given significant attention in the existing literature. Specifically, this thesis offers a critical analysis of interpretations of primary rules in light of the positions of states and existing state practice supported by case studies and hypothetical scenarios to provide a detailed evaluation of primary rules lex lata to cyber operations.The research aligns most closely to the 'Global Uncertainties' EPSRC's strategies and research area. There are no companies or collaborators involved in the research.