Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Pay for non-instrumental information: an experimental study

经济学博士学位论文研究：支付非工具信息：一个实验研究（SES: 1656235）信息在经济活动中起着重要的作用。然而，根据标准的经济学观点，任何信息只有在能改善决策时才有价值。这意味着不愿意为非必要的信息付费。然而，实验数据却记录了相反的现象。该项目测试在最佳选择满足博弈论中更强的解决方案概念的情况下，对这些非必要信息的需求是否会减少。考虑到推理的认知成本，或许可以解释为什么在理论上可能是非工具性的信息，对于不完全理性的参与者来说却可能很重要。拟议研究的结果将对一般经济理论和诸如在执行机制或政策执行中披露信息等应用产生根本性影响。本研究旨在实验调查不完全信息博弈中非工具信息的支付意愿，其中最优策略要么只是优势策略，要么是明显优势策略，这是一个更强的解决方案概念。该项目将解决关于具有优势策略的游戏行为的基本问题：当优势策略不够明显时，找出优势策略是否需要成本？与这种明显性相关的认知成本是否会影响对非工具性信息的需求？本研究的主要方法是对不完全信息下的单次范式博弈的收益表进行操纵。在所有的处理中，最优选择是优势策略，但可能不是明显的优势策略。我们询问受试者是否愿意付费来了解自然状态或对手的策略。这些信息不会改变主导战略。然而，如果被试因为优势策略的不明显而对其有困难，当最优选择不是明显优势策略时，他们可能愿意为这些信息付费。此外，如果被试没有其他理由要求获得信息，当最优选择已经是明显的优势策略时，他们不应该选择支付费用。在主实验之后，所有受试者将被要求参加一个由Esponda和Vespa（2014）提出的投票游戏，以测试受试者？假设思维的能力。这一额外的任务使我们能够调查为非工具性信息付费的选择是否与受试者有关？假设推理的能力，并验证他们在不同环境中不识别优势策略但不明显的优势策略是否一致。

Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Pay for non-instrumental information: an experimental study (SES: 1656235)Information plays an important role in economic activities. However, by the standard economic view, any information is valuable only if it improves decision-making. This implies no willingness to pay for non-essential information. Experimental data, however, documents the opposite phenomena. This project tests if demand for such non-essential information diminishes in situations where the best choice satisfies a stronger solution concept in game theory. Accounting for the cognitive cost of reasoning may explain why information that may be non-instrumental in theory might nevertheless be important for less than fully rational players. The results of the proposed study will have fundamental implications for economic theory in general and applications such as disclosure of information in implementing mechanisms or policy implementation. The proposed research is aimed at experimental investigation of willingness to pay for non-instrumental information in games with incomplete information where the optimal strategy is either just dominant strategy or obviously dominant strategy, an even stronger solution concept. The project will address fundamental questions about behavior in games with dominant strategy: Is it costly to figure out dominant strategy when it is not obviously enough, and do cognitive costs associated with such obviousness affect the demand of non-instrumental information?The primary approach of the proposed research manipulates the payoff tables of a one-shot normal form game with incomplete information. In all the treatments, the optimal choice is dominant strategy, but might not be obviously dominant strategy. We ask subjects if they are willing to pay a fee to learn the state of nature or the strategy of the opponent. The information will not change the dominant strategy. However, if subjects have difficulty with dominant strategy because of its un-obviousness, they may be willing to pay for such information when the optimal choice is not obviously dominant strategy. Moreover, if subjects have no other reasons for demanding the information, they should not choose to pay the fee when the optimal choice is already obviously dominant strategy. Following the main experiment, all subjects will be asked to participate in a voting game, proposed by Esponda and Vespa (2014) to tests the subjects? abilities of hypothetical thinking. This additional task allows us to investigate whether the choice of paying for non-instrumental information is related to the subjects? ability in hypothetical reasoning, and to verify whether their failure to recognize dominant strategy but not obviously dominant strategy is consistent across different environments.