Collaborative Research: Multi-Unit Demand Auctions

合作研究：多单位需求拍卖

• 批准号: 9631845
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Ohio State University Research Foundation -DO NOT USE
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1996
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1996-08-01 至 2000-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9631845&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Multi; Unit; Demand

Recent theoretical developments in multi-unit demand (one sided) auctions make it clear that uniform price auctions create an incentive for demand reductions (bid shaving) resulting in inefficient outcomes. In contrast, extensions of the Vickrey auction rule to multi-unit demand auctions promise, in theory, to restore economic efficiency and to raise expected revenue relative to uniform price auctions under a wide variety of circumstances. These predictions rest critically on bidders recognizing and responding appropriately to the strategic opportunities for demand reductions in uniform price auctions and following a "sincere" bidding strategy in the Vickrey auctions. The purpose of this research is to explore behavior in multi-unit demand auctions through both theory and experiments. The experiments will focus on the extent to which bidders reduce demand, and the resulting inefficiencies and revenue impact, in uniform price auctions when bidders have equal and unequal demands and with more or less intense competition. Vickrey auction experiments will focus on the effects of different implementation rules for inducing sincere bidding using a relatively transparent, open English clock auction procedure and a sealed bid version of the clock procedure that may prove more tractable in field settings. Behavior will be studied in both interactive and non-interactive (games against computerized bidders) environments with the latter designed to eliminate the "noise" associated with other players' actions on learning to behave strategically. Theoretical work will provide benchmark models against which to evaluate the experimental outcomes and to identify conditions where there are tradeoffs in theory, between efficiency and revenue under the different auction institutions. Work in multi-unit demand auctions is important because (i) most auctions involve multi-unit demands and (ii) a number of insights obtained from unit demand auctions fail to hold with multi-un it demands. Many of these issues have come to the forefront-with the design and implementation of the recent spectrum auctions.

多单位需求（单方面）拍卖的最新理论发展清楚地表明，统一价格拍卖会刺激需求减少（削价），从而导致低效结果。 相比之下，从理论上讲，将维克里拍卖规则扩展到多单位需求拍卖有望恢复经济效率，并在各种情况下相对于统一价格拍卖提高预期收入。 这些预测关键取决于投标人是否认识到统一价格拍卖中减少需求的战略机会并做出适当反应，并在维克里拍卖中遵循“真诚”的投标策略。 本研究的目的是通过理论和实验探索多单位需求拍卖的行为。 实验将重点关注当投标人有相同和不平等的需求以及或多或少激烈的竞争时，在统一价格拍卖中投标人减少需求的程度，以及由此产生的效率低下和收入影响。 维克里拍卖实验将侧重于使用相对透明、开放的英国时钟拍卖程序和时钟程序的密封投标版本（在现场设置中可能更容易处理）来诱导真诚投标的不同实施规则的效果。 行为将在交互式和非交互式（针对计算机化投标人的游戏）环境中进行研究，后者旨在消除与其他玩家学习策略性行为相关的“噪音”。 理论工作将提供基准模型，用于评估实验结果，并确定不同拍卖机构下效率和收入之间理论上存在权衡的条件。 多单位需求拍卖的工作很重要，因为（i）大多数拍卖涉及多单位需求，以及（ii）从单位需求拍卖中获得的许多见解不适用于多单位需求。随着最近频谱拍卖的设计和实施，其中许多问题已经成为人们关注的焦点。