Doctoral Dissertation Research: Do Irrelevant Payoffs Affect Behavior When a Dominant Strategy is Available: Experimental Evidence from Second-Price Auctions

博士论文研究：当存在主导策略时，不相关的收益是否会影响行为：来自二价拍卖的实验证据

• 批准号: 0921780
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 0.75万
• 依托单位: Ohio State University Research Foundation -DO NOT USE
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-07-01 至 2011-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0921780&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Do; Irrelevant

In a second-price auction (SPA) with private values, the bidder who submits the highest bid wins the auction and pays the second highest bid. In a SPA, bidders simultaneously submit one bid each. According to theory, the bidder's best strategy is to bid exactly what the item is worth to her. In game theory parlance this optimal bid is known as a "dominant strategy," that is, it is optimal for each bidder regardless of what others are bidding. Dominant strategies have robust properties but are extremely rare in auction environments. Past evidence from laboratory experiments has shown that bidders almost always bid above the amount corresponding to the dominant strategy in an SPA, i.e. they behave irrationally according to the theory. This project examines the conjecture that, while bidding behavior is not rational, it does respond in a sensible and predictable way to incentives. A laboratory experiment will test whether bids above the dominant strategy increase when such overbidding is less costly, and decrease when it is more costly, even though the experiment is constructed so that these incentives do not affect the value of the dominant strategy bid itself.Should the conjecture prove correct, the results will inform designers of selling mechanisms. Although game theory makes very clear predictions, bidders do not often behave exactly as predicted. Results from investigations that examine systematic deviations from the theory can be incorporated by auction designers who wish to maximize revenue or efficiency. Given that such auctions have been used by both government and the private sector to sell a variety of securities and physical assets, the practical applications of such research are widespread.

在具有私人价值的第二价格拍卖(SPA)中，提交最高出价的投标人赢得拍卖，并支付第二高出价。在SPA中，投标人同时每人提交一个出价。根据理论，投标者的最佳策略是准确地出价该物品对她的价值。在博弈论中，这种最优出价被称为“主导策略”，也就是说，无论其他投标人是什么出价，它对每个投标人都是最优的。占主导地位的策略具有稳健的性质，但在拍卖环境中极其罕见。过去的实验室实验证据表明，竞标者几乎总是出价高于SPA中占主导地位的策略所对应的金额，即根据理论他们的行为是非理性的。这个项目考察了这样一种猜想，即虽然竞价行为不是理性的，但它确实以一种明智和可预测的方式对激励做出了反应。一项实验室实验将测试，高于主导策略的报价是否会在这种过度竞价成本较低时增加，而在成本较高时降低，即使实验的构建是为了使这些激励措施不会影响主导策略报价本身的价值。如果猜想被证明是正确的，结果将向设计师提供销售机制的信息。尽管博弈论做出了非常明确的预测，但竞标者的行为往往并不完全像预测的那样。研究系统性偏离理论的调查结果可以被希望最大化收入或效率的拍卖设计师纳入。鉴于这种拍卖已被政府和私营部门用来出售各种证券和实物资产，这种研究的实际应用是广泛的。