Doctoral Dissertation Research: Strategic Complexity and Cooperation: An Experimental Study

该奖项资助了使用决策实验来调查重复游戏中策略复杂性重要性的研究。该项目将测试关于战略复杂性的可能认知成本的假设，以及这些成本如何影响在重复博弈中的合作决策，在重复博弈中，有效的结果需要合作，但每个参与者都可能从自私行为中受益。先前的博弈论文献表明，重复博弈中的合作可能受到战略环境复杂性的限制，因为与自私策略相比，合作策略通常具有更高的认知成本和更少的确定性结果。由该奖项资助的实验观察了标准无限重复囚徒困境中的合作率，并将其与类似但更复杂的战略环境中的合作率进行了比较。该设计允许调查对合作的影响是否取决于战略环境中复杂性的来源。更广泛的影响包括促进研究生教育和研究可能的跨学科影响，这跨越了博弈论，决策科学和行为经济学的界限。

This award funds research that uses decision-making experiments to investigate the importance of strategic complexity in repeated games. The project will test hypotheses about the possible cognitive costs of strategic complexity and how these costs affect decisions to cooperate in a repeated game in which the efficient outcome requires cooperation but each individual involved may benefit from selfish behavior.Previous literature in game theory indicates that cooperation in repeated games may be limited by the complexity of the strategic environment, as cooperative strategies are generally associated with greater cognitive costs and less certain outcomes than selfish strategies. The experiments funded by this award observe the cooperation rate in a standard indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and compare it with cooperation in a similar but more complex strategic environment. The design allows an investigation of whether the impact on cooperation depends on the source of complexity in the strategic environment.Broader impacts include contributing to graduate education and the possible interdisciplinary impact of the research, which crosses boundaries between game theory, decision science, and behavioral economics.