Doctoral Dissertation Research: Strategic Complexity and Cooperation: An Experimental Study

博士论文研究：战略复杂性与合作：实验研究

• 批准号: 1121085
• 负责人: Dan Levin
• 金额: $ 0.72万
• 依托单位: Ohio State University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-09-01 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1121085&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Strategic; Complexity

This award funds research that uses decision-making experiments to investigate the importance of strategic complexity in repeated games. The project will test hypotheses about the possible cognitive costs of strategic complexity and how these costs affect decisions to cooperate in a repeated game in which the efficient outcome requires cooperation but each individual involved may benefit from selfish behavior.Previous literature in game theory indicates that cooperation in repeated games may be limited by the complexity of the strategic environment, as cooperative strategies are generally associated with greater cognitive costs and less certain outcomes than selfish strategies. The experiments funded by this award observe the cooperation rate in a standard indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma and compare it with cooperation in a similar but more complex strategic environment. The design allows an investigation of whether the impact on cooperation depends on the source of complexity in the strategic environment.Broader impacts include contributing to graduate education and the possible interdisciplinary impact of the research, which crosses boundaries between game theory, decision science, and behavioral economics.

该奖项资助了一项研究，该研究利用决策实验来调查重复博弈中策略复杂性的重要性。该项目将测试关于战略复杂性可能的认知成本的假设，以及这些成本如何影响在重复博弈中合作的决定，在重复博弈中，有效结果需要合作，但参与的每个人都可能从自私行为中受益。以前的博弈论文献表明，重复博弈中的合作可能会受到战略环境复杂性的限制，因为合作策略通常与更大的认知成本和比自私策略更不确定的结果相关。由该奖项资助的实验观察了标准无限期重复的囚徒困境中的合作率，并将其与在类似但更复杂的战略环境中的合作进行比较。该设计允许调查对合作的影响是否取决于战略环境中的复杂性来源。更广泛的影响包括对研究生教育的贡献以及研究可能产生的跨学科影响，这项研究跨越了博弈论、决策科学和行为经济学之间的界限。