Electoral Participation under Alternative Jurisdictional Structures: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

我们建议用理论分析和实验室实验相结合的方法来研究不完全信息环境下投票和信息聚合两个问题之间的相互作用。第一个问题是选民的战略参与。第二是将选民划分为不同的司法管辖区。特别是，我们感兴趣的是，当选民具有策略性行为的动机时，替代选举划分的积极和规范影响。在早期关于投票的理论研究的基础上，我们建立了两种信息结构下的选举参与模型，共同价值观和私人价值观。这种方法将我们的工作与关于竞争性投标和拍卖的文献联系起来。在我们的模型中，选民的行为是战略性的，并对信息环境、投票成本和司法结构做出反应。这种依存性使人们能够调查把选民划分成不同管辖结构的积极和规范方面。这为根据基本信息环境对管辖结构进行排名提供了一个分析框架。为了激励和说明的目的，提出了一个简单的模型。所有的理论预测都将通过实验进行验证；提供了设计和治疗的示意图。自然，任何关于选举制度的规范性结论都是有效的，导致这些结论的预测行为必须反映真实行为。尤其令人感兴趣的是，实验对象如何对不同的激励做出反应。例如，将投票的直接成本和上面提到的信息因素参数化，并在不同的实验处理中改变它们的值，就可以推断这些因素相对于预测因素的强度。在收集的实验数据中，还可以直接观察不同司法机构在同一环境中的表现。这一项目的预期效果包括改进对影响选民参与的因素的看法，并为哪些问题应该在高度集中的权力级别解决，哪些问题应该在地方级别解决提供了科学佐证的处方。随着联邦政府将福利政策移交给各州，并就全国学校课程标准展开辩论，这一话题对当前美国的政治经济具有特别重要的意义。

We propose to study, using theoretical analysis and laboratory experiments, the interaction between two issues in voting and information aggregation in environments of incomplete information. The first issue is strategic participation by voters. The second is the partitioning of voters into jurisdictions. In particular, we are interested in the positive and normative implications of alternative electoral partitions when voters have an incentive to behave strategically.Building on earlier theoretical research on voting we develop model of electoral participation under two information structures, common values and private values. This approach connects our work with the literature on competitive bidding and auctions. In our model, voters behave strategically and respond to informational environments, costs of voting, and the jurisdictional structure. Such dependency allows the investigation of the positive and normative aspects of alternative partitions of the electorate into different jurisdictional structures. This provides an analytical framework for ranking jurisdictional structures based on the underlying informational environment. A simple model is presented for motivational and illustrative purpose.All theoretical predictions will be tested with experiments; a sketch of the design and treatments is provided. Naturally, for any normative conclusions regarding electoral systems to be valid, the predicted behavior leading to these conclusions must mirror real behavior. Of particular interest is how experimental subjects respond to different incentives. For example, parameterizing the direct costs of voting and the informational factors referred to above and varying their values across experimental treatments will allow inferences about the strengths of these factors relative to those that are predicted. The performance of different jurisdictional structures within the same environment can also be observed directly in the experimental data collected.The desired impact of this project includes an improved perspective on the factors influencing voter participation, and scientifically corroborated prescriptions for what kinds of issues should be resolved at a highly centralized level of authority and what kinds at a localized level. As the federal government turns welfare policy over to the states and debates national school curriculum standards, this topic is of particular significance to current United States political economy.