Electoral Participation under Alternative Jurisdictional Structures: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

本文拟采用理论分析与实验室实验相结合的方法，研究不完全信息环境下投票与信息聚合的相互作用。第一个问题是选民的战略性参与。第二是将选民划分为不同的司法管辖区。特别是，当选民有动机采取战略行动时，我们对替代选举分区的积极和规范含义感兴趣。在前期投票理论研究的基础上，我们建立了共同价值观和私人价值观两种信息结构下的选举参与模型。这种方法将我们的工作与竞争性投标和拍卖的文献联系起来。在我们的模型中，选民的行为是战略性的，并对信息环境、投票成本和司法结构做出反应。这种依赖关系使我们能够调查将选民划分为不同管辖结构的其他方面的积极和规范方面。这为基于底层信息环境对司法结构进行排序提供了一个分析框架。为了激励和说明目的，提出了一个简单的模型。所有的理论预测都将用实验来检验；提供了设计和处理的草图。当然，任何关于选举制度的规范性结论要想有效，导致这些结论的预测行为必须反映真实的行为。特别有趣的是实验对象如何对不同的激励作出反应。例如，参数化投票的直接成本和上面提到的信息因素，并在实验处理中改变它们的值，将允许推断这些因素相对于预测因素的优势。不同管辖结构在相同环境下的表现也可以通过收集的实验数据直接观察到。这一项目的预期影响包括改进对影响选民参与的因素的看法，并科学地证实哪些问题应在高度集中的权力一级解决，哪些问题应在地方一级解决。随着联邦政府将福利政策移交给各州，并就国家学校课程标准进行辩论，这一话题对当前美国政治经济学具有特别重要的意义。

We propose to study, using theoretical analysis and laboratory experiments, the interaction between two issues in voting and information aggregation in environments of incomplete information. The first issue is strategic participation by voters. The second is the partitioning of voters into jurisdictions. In particular, we are interested in the positive and normative implications of alternative electoral partitions when voters have an incentive to behave strategically.Building on earlier theoretical research on voting we develop model of electoral participation under two information structures, common values and private values. This approach connects our work with the literature on competitive bidding and auctions. In our model, voters behave strategically and respond to informational environments, costs of voting, and the jurisdictional structure. Such dependency allows the investigation of the positive and normative aspects of alternative partitions of the electorate into different jurisdictional structures. This provides an analytical framework for ranking jurisdictional structures based on the underlying informational environment. A simple model is presented for motivational and illustrative purpose.All theoretical predictions will be tested with experiments; a sketch of the design and treatments is provided. Naturally, for any normative conclusions regarding electoral systems to be valid, the predicted behavior leading to these conclusions must mirror real behavior. Of particular interest is how experimental subjects respond to different incentives. For example, parameterizing the direct costs of voting and the informational factors referred to above and varying their values across experimental treatments will allow inferences about the strengths of these factors relative to those that are predicted. The performance of different jurisdictional structures within the same environment can also be observed directly in the experimental data collected.The desired impact of this project includes an improved perspective on the factors influencing voter participation, and scientifically corroborated prescriptions for what kinds of issues should be resolved at a highly centralized level of authority and what kinds at a localized level. As the federal government turns welfare policy over to the states and debates national school curriculum standards, this topic is of particular significance to current United States political economy.