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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Bayesian Persuasion in the Lab?

Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Bayesian Persuasion in the Lab?
经济学博士论文研究:实验室中的贝叶斯说服?
批准号:
1919390
负责人:
Dan Levin
金额:
$1.64万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2019
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2019-08-15 至 2021-07-31

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中文摘要
翻译
贝叶斯说服描述了这样一种现象,即信息的发送者打算通过选择接收者可以访问的信息来动摇接收者采取他/她想要的行动。这种情况发生在许多经济和社会环境中,例如检察官说服法官将嫌疑人定罪,或政治家说服选民他/她是最佳候选人,因此值得他们投票。虽然贝叶斯说服已经在理论上进行了研究,但很少有真实的世界研究其含义。鉴于贝叶斯说服的普遍性和复杂性,重要的是要调查发送者是否能找到最好的信息,以最大的频率诱导他/她想要的行动,如果不能,是什么让它如此困难。 本研究将使用一系列实验来研究贝叶斯说服现象。 这样的调查有助于建立对涉及贝叶斯说服的几种情况的理解,例如检察官如何选择调查刑事案件以及政治家如何设计他们的促销活动。本研究的成果将提高广告、公共政策宣传和一般政策讨论的效率。本项目使用一系列实验室实验来测试贝叶斯说服理论。 研究人员将设计实验室实验,最大限度地简化发送者的贝叶斯说服过程。 实验设计将消除发送者执行任何贝叶斯更新的需要。 由于人们通常不能进行贝叶斯更新,这种简化允许研究人员只关注贝叶斯说服推理的关键部分。然后,实验将对问题引入一些实际困难,以检查结果的鲁棒性。研究的目的是阐明贝叶斯说服理论的实证合理性-理论预测在多大程度上是正确的,以及经济学家应该如何在必要时修改他们对理论的理解。 本课题的研究结果不仅验证了贝叶斯说服理论,而且展示了其实际应用。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
英文摘要
Bayesian Persuasion describes the phenomena where a sender of information intends to sway a receiver to take his/her desired action by choosing what information the receiver can access. This occurs in many economic and social settings, for example a prosecutor persuading a judge to convict a suspect or a politician persuading voters that he/she is the best candidate and therefore deserve their vote. While Bayesian Persuasion has been studied in theory, there has been little real world study of its implications. Given the prevalence and complexity of the use of Bayesian Persuasion, it is important to investigate whether the sender can find the best information to induce his/her desired action with the maximum frequency, and if not, what makes it so difficult. This proposed research will use a series of experiments to study the Bayesian Persuasion phenomenon. Such an investigation helps to build an understanding about several situations that involve Bayesian Persuasion, such as how a prosecutor chooses to investigate a criminal case and how politicians design their promotion campaigns. The results of this research will improve the efficiency of advertising, public policy campaigns, and general policy discussions.This project uses a series of lab experiments to test the theory of Bayesian Persuasion. The researchers will design laboratory experiments where the process of Bayesian Persuasion is maximally simplified for the sender. The experimental design will eliminate the need for the sender to perform any Bayesian updating. Because people are in general not capable of Bayesian updating, such simplification allows researchers to focus solely on the key parts of the Bayesian Persuasion reasoning. The experiment will then introduce some realistic difficulties to the problem to check the robustness of the results. The research goal is to shed light on the empirical soundness of the theory of Bayesian Persuasion---to what extent is the theoretical prediction correct and how should economists revise their understanding of the theory if necessary. The results of this research project will not only (in)validate the theory of Bayesian Persuasion but also show its practical application. This will improve discourse on important issues in business, public policy, and governance generally.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
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Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: Pay for non-instrumental information: an experimental study
  • 批准号:
    1656235
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $1.54万
  • 财政年份:
    2017
  • 负责人:
    Dan Levin
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Strategic Complexity and Cooperation: An Experimental Study
  • 批准号:
    1121085
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $0.72万
  • 财政年份:
    2011
  • 负责人:
    Dan Levin
  • 依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Do Irrelevant Payoffs Affect Behavior When a Dominant Strategy is Available: Experimental Evidence from Second-Price Auctions
Doctoral Dissertation Research: Ambiguity Aversion and Strategic Play in One-Shot Normal-Form Games
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