Emergence of Money as a Medium of Exchange: An Experimental Analysis

9507968达菲一个社会形成的最重要的习俗之一是接受至少一个物体作为“交换媒介”。当许多对自己消费或生产使用的物品没有兴趣的代理人在贸易中接受该物品，并理性地预期他们将能够用它来交易对自己具有内在价值的商品时，该物品就成为了一个社区中的交换媒介。货币理论家面临的挑战是确定决定哪个对象(S)将获得交换媒介地位的因素。这个项目的目标是构建一个对Kiyotaki-Wright模型的实验分析，该模型是唯一可以在不依赖法律限制的情况下解释为什么某些储存成本相对较高或回报率占主导地位的商品仍然可以作为交换媒介的货币模型。Kiyotaki和Wright只是对他们模型的静态均衡进行了描述。它们没有提供任何关于一种商品是如何成为交换媒介的说明。因此，这项实验的目的之一是测试置身于清谷-赖特环境中的个人是否会随着时间的推移学习采用相同的商品作为交换媒介，正如模型所暗示的那样，将在均衡中如此使用。这样，实验将是对均衡预测对非均衡游戏所产生的动态的稳健性的测试。有一大类重要的经济模型与Kiyotaki-Wright模型具有相同的性质，即它们是具有战略互补性的动态博弈。实验的第二个目标是提供一系列关于具有这些属性的简单游戏中游戏演变的经验观察，以便我们将有一个经验基础来模拟由这种环境引起的学习动力。这样的学习动态模型可以与基于对具有战略互补性的博弈的研究的模型进行比较，这些模型没有明确的动态回报结构。

9507968 Duffy One of the most important conventions a society develops is the acceptance of at least one object as a "medium of exchange". An object becomes a medium of exchange in a community when many agents who have no interest in that object for their own consumption or use in production nevertheless accept the object in trade with the rational expectation that they will be able to trade it for goods which are of intrinsic value to themselves. The challenge to monetary theorists is to identify the factors that determine which object(s) will acquire the status of a medium of exchange. The objective of this project is to construct an experiment analysis of the Kiyotaki-Wright model, the only model of money that can explain without relying on legal restrictions why certain goods that have relatively high storage costs or are dominated in rate of return can nevertheless serve as media of exchange. Kiyotaki and Wright only provide a characterization of the stationary equilibria of their model. They do not provide any account of how a commodity emerges as a medium of exchange. One purpose of this experiment, therefore, is to test whether individuals placed in the Kiyotaki-Wright environment learn over time to adopt the same commodities as exchange media as the model implies will be so used in equilibrium. In this way the experiment will be a test of the robustness of the equilibrium predictions to dynamics created by out-of-equilibrium play. There is a large class of important economic models that share with the Kiyotaki-Wright model the properties that they are dynamic games with strategic complementarities. A second goal of the experiment is to provide a body of empirical observations on the evolution of play in a simple game having these properties so that we will have an empirical basis for modeling the learning dynamics evoked by such environments. Such models of learning dynamics can then be compared with models based upon the study of games with strategic complementarities tha t do not have an explicitly dynamic payoff structure.