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The Theory of International Economic Institutions

The Theory of International Economic Institutions
国际经济制度理论
批准号:
9905460
负责人:
Robert Staiger
金额:
$16.37万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1999
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1999-07-01 至 2002-06-30

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中文摘要
翻译
关贸总协定(现在是它的继承者,世贸组织)在世界经济中所起的重要作用已被广泛接受。自1947年成立以来,关贸总协定的成员国已从最初的23个国家增加到现在的100多个国家。关贸总协定成员国的扩大反映了该组织在促进关税削减方面取得的成功。通过GATT发起的8轮贸易政策谈判,工业品的平均从价税从40%以上降至4%以下。鉴于《关贸总协定》对世界经济产生的重大影响,经济学家面临的一个重要问题是能否对《关贸总协定》及其主要特征进行理论解释。 虽然关贸总协定过去的成功本身就证明有理由对其主要特征进行理论研究,但在考虑这一多边机构的未来时,这项任务也许更为重要。今后几年的一个关键问题是,战后多边自由化所依据的同一套原则是否能够或应该适用于一系列“新的”贸易政策问题。这些问题包括推广优惠贸易协定、协调竞争政策以及保护环境、知识产权和人权。理解为什么关贸总协定的原则在更传统的工业品多边关税自由化竞技场中运作良好,可以为回答这一关键问题奠定基础。 本研究的目的是,从理论上理解GATT的基本原则,并利用这一理解来研究GATT在传统领域取得成功的本质,探讨将GATT的基本设计特征扩展到新领域的可能性,并根据GATT的相关知识,开始探索IMF等国际金融机构的独特性。我们建议通过建立一个调查我们已经制定的贸易协定性质的总体框架来实现这一目标。我们提出的研究的第一个目标是显示如何在这个框架内解释和理解GATT的互惠和非歧视的核心支柱。我们建议的研究的第二个目标是考虑与执行GATT承诺问题相关的几个方面。我们提出的研究的第三个目标是扩展我们的框架,以研究关贸总协定现在面临的“新”问题,如劳工和环境标准。第四个也是最后一个目标,是超越对贸易规则和制度的研究,调查国际金融机构的经济学。
英文摘要
The important role played in the world economy by GATT (and now it successor, the WTO) is widely accepted. Since its creation in 1947, GATT has grown in membership from an initial set of 23 countries to a roster that now exceeds 100 countries. The expanding GATT membership reflects the success that this organization has had in facilitating tariff reductions. Through the 8 rounds of trade-policy negotiations that have been sponsored by GATT, the average ad valorem tariff on industrial goods has fallen from over 40% to below 4%. In light of the significant impact that GATT has had on the world economy, an important question for economists is whether a theoretical interpretation of GATT and its main features can be provided. While the past success of GATT justifies in its own right a theoretical investigation of its main features, this task is perhaps even more important when the future of this multilateral institution is considered. A critical question in the coming years is whether the same set of principles on which postwar multilateral liberalization has been based can or should be applied to a host of "new" trade policy issues. These issues include the spread of preferential trading agreements, the harmonization of competition policies, and the protection of the environment, intellectual property and human rights. An understanding of why GATT's principles have worked well in the more traditional arena of multilateral tariff liberalization for industrial goods can lay the foundation for answers to this critical question. The purpose of our proposed research is to develop a theoretical understanding of GATT's essential principles, and to use this understanding to investigate the nature of GATT's success in traditional areas, to examine the potential for extending the essential design features of GATT to new areas, and to begin an exploration of the distinctive features of international financial institutions such as the IMF in light of what is learned about GATT. We propose to accomplish this by building on a general framework for investigating the nature of trade agreements that we have already developed. A first goal of our proposed research is to show how GATT's central pillars of reciprocity and non-discrimination may be interpreted and understood within this framework. A second goal of our proposed research is to consider several dimensions associated with the issue of enforcement of GATT commitments. A third goal of our proposed research is to extend our framework to examine "new" issues that GATT now confronts such as labor and environmental standards. And a fourth and final goal of our proposed research is to move beyond the study of trade rules and institutions to investigate the economics of international financial institutions.
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Multilateral Trade Bargaining: Theory and Evidence from the GATT Bargaining Records
The Economics of the WTO: Empirical Assessment, Enforcement with Private Information, and Dispute Settlement Procedures
The Trade Effects of Antidumping Investigations
Rules Versus Discretion in Trade Policy: An Empirical Anaylsis
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