A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning

正义推理的价值保护模型

• 批准号: 0111612
• 负责人: Linda Skitka
• 金额: $ 20万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Chicago
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2001-09-01 至 2004-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0111612&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Value; Protection; Model; Justice; Reasoning

The goal of this research is to test the theoretical possibility that personal identity concerns play an important role in how people decide whether something is fair or unfair, and to explore how these concerns relate to people's ability to generate procedures to resolve conflict. Specifically, people are highly motivated to act in ways that allow for public and private affirmation of the belief that they are authentically good and moral beings (Steele, 1988). Given that moral values form the core of personal identity (Rokeach, 1973), self-affirmation should involve endorsing self-expressive moral positions or stands, or what Skitka (in press) has referred to as "moral mandates." Thinking about, experiencing, witnessing, or behaving in a way that leads to a violation of a moral mandate should be experienced as a threat to people's sense of self, and therefore should be defended more vigorously than other kinds of strong attitudes. One implication of this line of theorizing is that people should have much greater difficulty negotiating procedures to decide issues that involve moral mandates than they do for issues that involve other concerns. To test this hypothesis, research participants (college students) participating in small heterogeneous or homogeneous groups, will be asked to come to consensus on a fair procedure to decide an issue that they either (a) have a moral mandate about, (b) do not have a moral mandate about, or (c) have a strong attitude, but not a moral mandate about. Groups will have three options to end negotiations: Unanimously agree to a procedure that each participant agrees that they could accept as a binding way to decide their assigned issue; unanimously agree that they will never come to consensus on a binding procedure; or 1 hour passes (whichever occurs first). Groups' ability to generate a consensually accepted procedure, perceptions of the group process and other group members, and degree of post-discussion attitude change (i.e., polarization on morally mandated as compared to non-morally mandated issues) as a function of group discussion will be assessed. A follow-up study will explore the perceived fairness of the procedures generated in the group discussion study when they are evaluated without reference to a specific issue.

本研究的目的是测试理论上的可能性，即个人身份的关注，在人们如何决定是否是公平或不公平的，并探讨这些问题如何涉及到人们的能力，产生程序来解决冲突。具体来说，人们的行为方式非常积极，允许公开和私下肯定他们是真正善良和道德的人（斯蒂尔，1988）。鉴于道德价值观构成了个人身份的核心（Rokeach，1973），自我肯定应该包括认可自我表达的道德立场或立场，或者Skitka（在新闻中）所说的“道德命令”。思考、经历、目睹或行为方式导致违反道德使命，应该被视为对人们自我意识的威胁，因此应该比其他类型的强烈态度更有力地加以捍卫。这一理论的一个含义是，人们在谈判涉及道德使命的问题时，比在谈判涉及其他问题时，更难进行决策。 为了检验这一假设，研究参与者（大学生）参加小型异质或同质群体，将被要求达成共识的一个公平的程序来决定一个问题，他们要么（a）有一个道德的使命，（B）没有道德的使命，或（c）有一个强烈的态度，但没有道德的使命。 小组有三种选择来结束谈判：一致同意每个参与者都同意他们可以接受的程序，作为决定他们分配的问题的约束性方式;一致同意他们永远不会就约束性程序达成共识;或者1小时过去（以先发生者为准）。 小组形成一致接受的程序的能力，对小组过程和其他小组成员的看法，以及讨论后态度变化的程度（即，将评估作为小组讨论功能的道德授权问题与非道德授权问题之间的两极分化。 后续研究将探讨在小组讨论研究中产生的程序，当他们没有提到一个具体的问题进行评估时，感知的公平性。