The Role of Authority and Communication in Cooperation

合作中权威和沟通的作用

• 批准号: 0350969
• 负责人: Andrew Postlewaite
• 金额: $ 29.32万
• 依托单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-07-01 至 2008-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0350969&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Role; Authority; Communication; Cooperation

This project will use the tools of game theory to provide an improved understanding of cooperation in large groups. These tools have been used by others to understand cooperation in small groups. However, the insights from this work do not provide much insight into what happens in larger groups.The project has two parts. The first part addresses authority - whatit is, how a person might acquire it, maintain it and use it. The aim is to provide an understanding of authority that centers on an individual's ability to coordinate other players' actions. A good model of authority should have several features. First, an individual has authority when a group of people coordinate their behavior in response to announcements by that individual. Second, there is a tension between the incentives of the individual with authority to maintain that authority and to take advantage of his authority. Third, too much flexibility or unpredictability can destroy authority. Fourth, authority need not necessarily come from some special ability or talent. Fifth, authority does not arise from people simply coordinating on a choice identified by the "authority" figure. The principal investigators will build models with these features and use them to analyze authority.The second part of the project looks at the role of communication between the members of large groups. Previous work on how groups cooperate over time has included punishment as a central ingredient. The idea is that people cooperate because they know that they will be punished by the group for non-cooperation. However, in a large group, it is not likely that all group members will immediately know that someone else has chosen non-cooperation. Punishment is only possible if members of the group communicate. However, the mere possibility of communication won't ensure cooperation; people have to have an incentive to tell the truth about others for cooperation to be enforced. This part of the project will again use game theory to analyze when and how large groups can use communication to encourage cooperation.This research will provide a better understanding of how cooperation does and does not work in large social groups. A central question in economics, and other social sciences, is why some countries or groups do less well than others. The variation in performance does not appear to be adequately explained by differences in available resources, suggesting that differences in social organization are likely to be important. The focus is on particular aspects of social organization, authority and communication, as important determinants of the level of cooperation possible within a society. The work will provide a foundation for more applied work aimed at understanding differences among societies by providing models linking social structure to social performance.

这个项目将使用博弈论的工具，以提供一个更好的理解在大集团的合作。 这些工具已被其他人用来了解小团体的合作。 然而，这项工作的见解并没有提供更多关于更大群体中发生的事情的见解。该项目有两个部分。第一部分讨论权威--权威是什么，一个人如何获得、维护和使用权威。目的是提供对权威的理解，这种理解以个人协调其他参与者行动的能力为中心。一个好的权威模型应该具有几个特征。首先，当一群人协调他们的行为以回应个人的声明时，个人就有了权威。 第二，在拥有权威的个人维护权威和利用权威的动机之间存在着紧张关系。 第三，太多的灵活性或不可预测性会破坏权威。 第四，权威不一定来自某种特殊的能力或天赋。 第五，权威并不是由人们简单地根据“权威”人物所确定的选择进行协调而产生的。 主要研究人员将建立具有这些特征的模型，并使用它们来分析权威。该项目的第二部分着眼于大型团体成员之间的沟通作用。 以前关于群体如何随着时间的推移而合作的工作包括惩罚作为核心成分。 这个想法是人们合作，因为他们知道他们会因为不合作而受到群体的惩罚。 然而，在一个大的群体中，不太可能所有的群体成员都立即知道其他人选择了不合作。 只有当组织成员 communicate. 然而，仅仅沟通的可能性并不能确保合作;人们必须有动机说出他人的真相，以加强合作。 这一部分的项目将再次使用博弈论来分析大型群体何时以及如何使用沟通来鼓励合作。这项研究将提供一个更好的理解合作是如何在大型社会群体中工作的。经济学和其他社会科学的一个中心问题是，为什么有些国家或群体比其他国家或群体做得更差。可用资源的差异似乎不能充分解释绩效的差异，这表明社会组织的差异可能很重要。重点是社会组织、权威和沟通的特定方面，这些方面是一个社会内可能的合作水平的重要决定因素。这项工作将为旨在通过提供将社会结构与社会绩效联系起来的模型来了解社会之间差异的更多应用工作奠定基础。