The Foundations of Cooperation

合作的基础

基本信息

  • 批准号:
    0648780
  • 负责人:
  • 金额:
    --
  • 依托单位:
  • 依托单位国家:
    美国
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
  • 财政年份:
    2007
  • 资助国家:
    美国
  • 起止时间:
    2007-07-01 至 2011-06-30
  • 项目状态:
    已结题

项目摘要

The project continues and extends the principal investigators' previous work on the organization of society, and draws heavily on our previous National Science Foundation projects in this area. The results of the project will provide a better understanding of cooperation in large groups. There is a large body of work on dynamic games that demonstrates the circumstances under which cooperation can be enforced in groups of agents behaving strategically. Much of this work has been motivated by oligopolistic problems with relatively few players; the insights from these models provide a less than completely satisfactory understanding of cooperation in large groups.The project consists of two parts. The first part addresses authority - what it is, how a person might acquire it, maintain it, and use it. The aim is to provide an understanding of authority that centers on an individual's ability to coordinate other players' actions. A good model of authority should satisfy several desiderata, including: (i) An individual has authority when a group of agents coordinates their behavior in response to announcements by that individual; (ii) There is a tension between the incentives of the individual with authority to maintain that authority and to take advantage of his authority; (iii) Too much flexibility or unpredictability can destroy authority; (iv) Authority need not reflect some special ability; (v) Authority does not arise from players simply coordinating on an equilibrium identified by the "authority" figure.Punishment is a central ingredient of most models of cooperation in dynamic games, with punishment typically taking the form of coordinated actions following perceived deviations from prescribed play. The coordination in punishing deviations often rests on common knowledge, or near common knowledge, among the players about past signals of deviations. Such consensus is unlikely to arise from players' direct observations in large groups, and any consensus is likely to involve communication among the members of the group. The second part of the project involves adding communication to dynamic games. The mere possibility of communication will not ensure cooperation; the communication protocol must give agents an incentive to truthfully reveal their information for cooperation to be enforced.The notion of informational size of agents has been recently introduced to capture the importance of information held privately by a single agent, taking the information of other agents as given. The project investigates the connection between informational size and the degree to which incentives can be constructed to induce agents to reveal private information.Broader ImpactsThe research will provide a better understanding of how cooperation obtains in large social groups. A central question in economics and other social sciences as well is why some countries or groups do less well than others. The variation in performance seems not due primarily to differences in available resources, suggesting that differences in social organization are likely to be important. The project focuses on particular aspects of social organization - authority and communication - as important determinants of the level of cooperation possible within a society. The research will provide a foundation for more applied work aimed at understanding differences among societies by providing models linking social structure to social performance.
该项目继续并扩展了主要研究人员以前在社会组织方面的工作,并在很大程度上借鉴了我们以前在该领域的国家科学基金会项目。该项目的结果将有助于更好地理解大型团体的合作。有大量关于动态游戏的研究表明,在有策略行为的代理群体中,合作可以被强制执行。这方面的大部分工作都是由参与者相对较少的寡头垄断问题推动的;来自这些模型的见解提供了对大型群体合作的不完全令人满意的理解。该项目由两部分组成。第一部分讨论权威——它是什么,一个人如何获得它、维护它和使用它。其目的是提供一种对权威的理解,这种权威以个人协调其他参与者行动的能力为中心。一个良好的权威模型应该满足以下几个要求,包括:(i)当一群行为人根据该个人的通知协调其行为时,该个人就具有权威;有权威的个人维持其权威和利用其权威的动机之间存在紧张关系;太大的灵活性或不可预测性会破坏权威;权威不必反映某种特殊能力;(v)权威不是来自于玩家简单地根据“权威”数字确定的平衡进行协调。在动态游戏中,惩罚是大多数合作模式的核心要素,惩罚通常是在玩家感知到偏离规定玩法后采取协调行动。惩罚偏差的协调通常取决于参与者对过去偏差信号的共同知识或接近共同知识。这样的共识不太可能来自玩家在大型团队中的直接观察,任何共识都可能涉及团队成员之间的沟通。项目的第二部分是将交流添加到动态游戏中。仅仅有交流的可能性并不能保证合作;通信协议必须激励代理人如实透露他们的信息,以加强合作。agent的信息大小的概念最近被引入,用于捕获单个agent私有信息的重要性,将其他agent的信息作为给定的。该项目研究了信息大小与激励机制的构建程度之间的联系,以诱导代理人披露私人信息。更广泛的影响这项研究将更好地理解在大型社会群体中合作是如何获得的。经济学和其他社会科学的一个核心问题是,为什么一些国家或群体的表现不如其他国家或群体好。表现的差异似乎主要不是由于可用资源的差异,这表明社会组织的差异可能很重要。该项目侧重于社会组织的某些方面- -权威和交流- -作为社会内可能的合作水平的重要决定因素。该研究将为更多旨在通过提供将社会结构与社会表现联系起来的模型来理解社会差异的应用工作奠定基础。

项目成果

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Andrew Postlewaite其他文献

The Complexity of the Consumer Problem and Mental Accounting
消费者问题的复杂性和心理账户
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2010
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    I. Gilboa;Andrew Postlewaite;D. Schmeidler
  • 通讯作者:
    D. Schmeidler
Plausible Cooperation, Third Version
合理的合作,第三版
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 1 Original title: `Enforceability of social norms'
阶级制度和社会规范的执行 1 原标题:“社会规范的执行力”
  • DOI:
    10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00058-9
  • 发表时间:
    1998
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    9.8
  • 作者:
    Harold L. Cole;G. Mailath;Andrew Postlewaite
  • 通讯作者:
    Andrew Postlewaite
A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
产生核心分配的群体激励兼容机制
  • DOI:
    10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7
  • 发表时间:
    1979
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    E. Kalai;Andrew Postlewaite;John E. Roberts
  • 通讯作者:
    John E. Roberts
Pricing in Matching Markets
匹配市场定价
  • DOI:
  • 发表时间:
    2010
  • 期刊:
  • 影响因子:
    0
  • 作者:
    G. Mailath;Andrew Postlewaite;L. Samuelson
  • 通讯作者:
    L. Samuelson

Andrew Postlewaite的其他文献

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{{ truncateString('Andrew Postlewaite', 18)}}的其他基金

Signaling and Matching
信令和匹配
  • 批准号:
    1851449
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Uncertainty in Models of Authority and Models of Matching
权威模型和匹配模型的不确定性
  • 批准号:
    1559369
  • 财政年份:
    2016
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Topics in Matching
匹配主题
  • 批准号:
    1260753
  • 财政年份:
    2013
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
Transactions and Economic Relationships
交易和经济关系
  • 批准号:
    0961540
  • 财政年份:
    2010
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
The Role of Authority and Communication in Cooperation
合作中权威和沟通的作用
  • 批准号:
    0350969
  • 财政年份:
    2004
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
Authority and Social Assets
权威与社会资产
  • 批准号:
    0095768
  • 财政年份:
    2001
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant
A General Equilibrium Model Incorporating Social Concerns
纳入社会关注的一般均衡模型
  • 批准号:
    9511952
  • 财政年份:
    1995
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing grant
Topics in Economic Theory
经济理论专题
  • 批准号:
    9122980
  • 财政年份:
    1992
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing grant
Asymmetric Information
非对称的信息
  • 批准号:
    8912072
  • 财政年份:
    1989
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing grant
General Equilibrium Allocation Mechanisms and Risk Aversion
一般均衡配置机制和风险规避
  • 批准号:
    8007659
  • 财政年份:
    1980
  • 资助金额:
    --
  • 项目类别:
    Continuing Grant

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  • 批准号:
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