Asymmetric Information

这个项目涉及的经济体中，有不对称 信息. 它由三部分组成。 第一部分 开发了一个一般框架，用于研究市场时，代理商 不完全信息。 一般均衡模型是 在这种情况下，代理人拥有私人信息。 一种新型 衡量所持有信息的重要性 经济代理人。 该项目规定了以下条件： 大量的代理人改善了由于 不对称或私人信息的存在。 它 调查结果在多大程度上 同时几乎有效和激励相容， 市场的结果。 第二部分分析了我国在实施项目过程中存在的问题， 个人的评价是私下知道的环境 不能强迫个人参与。 最后一 第一节探讨了允许在 贝叶斯博弈 大多数分析游戏， 信息不对称忽略了这种可能性。 允许 通信可以扩展均衡集，如果 贝叶斯-纳什均衡的改进，可以缩小集合 预测的结果。 这个项目应该得到支持，因为所处理的问题是 重要. 第一部分一般均衡研究 拥有私人信息的代理模型可以提供一个 不同的不完美理论的统一框架 信息. 这项研究的初步结果 发现即使是少量的私人信息也会导致 在经济规模较大的国家， 经济主体的数量。 第二部分应提供 对一个群体必须解决的许多问题的有用见解 采取集体行动并分摊个别费用，或 这些行动的好处。 这种情况最普遍的例子是 问题是是否要承担公共项目，如果 项目成本如何分配 在小组成员中。 第三部分扩展了贝叶斯 游戏理论通过允许通信之前的发挥 游戏. 这一点很重要，因为贝叶斯博弈模型被用于 几乎经济学的每一个部分都是为了模拟代理人 可能有不同的信息和初步结果， 研究人员表明，赛前沟通可以有一个非常 对贝叶斯博弈结果的影响。

This project deals with economies in which there is asymmetric information. It consists of three parts. The first part develops a general framework for the study of markets when agents have imperfect information. A general equilibrium model is developed in which agents have private information. A novel measure is used of the significance of the information held by economic agents. The project establishes the conditions under which a large number of agents ameliorates the inefficiencies due to the presence of asymmetric or private information. It investigates the extent to which outcomes which are simultaneously nearly efficient and incentive compatible can be outcomes of markets. The second part examines the problems of undertaking projects in environments in which individuals' valuations are privately known and individuals cannot be forced to participate. The last section explores the effect of allowing communication prior to the play of a Bayesian game. Most analyses of games with asymmetric information ignore this possibility. Allowing communication can expand the set of equilibria and, if refinements of Bayes-Nash equilibria are used, can shrink the set of predicted outcomes. This project should be supported because the issues addressed are important. The research in the first part on general equilibrium models of agents with private information could provide a unifying framework for the different theories of imperfect information. The preliminary results from this line of research find that even a small amount of private information can cause surprisingly large inefficiencies in economies with large numbers of economic agents. The second part should provide useful insights into the many problems in which a group has to take a collective action and allocate individual costs or benefits of that actions. The most pervasive example of such a problem is whether to undertake a public project and, if undertaken, how the costs of the project are to be distributed among the members of the group. The third part extends Bayesian game theory by allowing communication prior to the play of the game. This is important because Bayesian game models are used in nearly every part of economics to model problems in which agents may have different information and the preliminary results by the investigator show that pre-play communication can have a very significant effect on the outcome of the Bayesian game.