Uncertainty in Models of Authority and Models of Matching

权威模型和匹配模型的不确定性

• 批准号: 1559369
• 负责人: Andrew Postlewaite
• 金额: $ 44万
• 依托单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2016
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2016-07-01 至 2020-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1559369&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Uncertainty; Models; Authority; Matching

The proposed work consists of two parts: The first part aims to enhance our understanding of the implications of stability of matching outcomes under incomplete information. There is a voluminous literature using matching models to analyze two-sided markets, including problems of matching students to schools, residents to hospitals and workers to firms. The commonly employed solution concept when analyzing matching problems is the core. The use of the core as a solution concept incorporates the stability of a proposed matching between workers and firms: if the proposed outcome is not in the core, we would expect the outcome to be upset by the pair that could jointly improve their circumstances. Matching typically assumes complete information: all parties know exactly what the consequences would be for any possible match. The assumption is crucial because for the standard problems to which these models are applied, participating agents care about the characteristics of their matched party. The PIs propose to extend previous work that defines pairwise stability in incomplete information environments. The main thrust of the proposed work in this area is to investigate how the techniques used can be modified to understand matching in many-to-one environments. The research will provide a better understanding the conditions that assure that there are stable matching of workers to firms and the efficiency properties of such matching. Such an understanding will give insight about possible interventions that will ameliorate inefficiencies in matching problems. The complete information matching theory has had a significant impact on the design of the mechanisms used to assign student to schools and residents to hospitals. This research has the potential of improving the economic performance of these mechanisms. In the second part of the proposal the PIs propose to formally model the process by which laws are, or are not, followed by the agents assumed to be subject to those laws. They suggest that some laws continue to be followed for some time, despite changes in the environment that affect agents' incentives to follow those laws, but then collapse quickly even though there seems to beno dramatic change in the environment. The PIs propose to formalize models of this process of social change that are consistent with such behavior.

本文的工作包括两个部分：第一部分旨在加深我们对不完全信息下匹配结果稳定性的理解。有大量文献使用匹配模型来分析双边市场，包括学生与学校、居民与医院以及工人与公司的匹配问题。分析匹配问题时常用的解决方案概念是核心。使用核心作为解决方案的概念，包含了工人和企业之间拟议匹配的稳定性：如果拟议的结果不在核心中，我们预计结果会被能够共同改善其环境的一对破坏。匹配通常假设完整的信息：所有各方都确切地知道任何可能的匹配会产生什么后果。该假设至关重要，因为对于应用这些模型的标准问题，参与代理关心其匹配方的特征。PI建议扩展以前的工作，定义不完全信息环境中的成对稳定性。在这方面的工作建议的主旨是调查如何使用的技术可以修改，以了解匹配在多对一的环境。这项研究将提供一个更好的理解的条件，确保有稳定的匹配工人的企业和效率的属性，这样的匹配。这样的理解将使人们了解可能的干预措施，这些干预措施将改善匹配问题中的低效率。完全信息匹配理论对分配学生到学校和居民到医院的机制的设计产生了重大影响。这项研究有可能提高这些机制的经济效益。在提案的第二部分，PI建议正式模拟法律被假定为受这些法律约束的代理人遵守或不遵守的过程。他们认为，一些法律继续遵循了一段时间，尽管环境的变化影响了代理人遵循这些法律的动机，但随后迅速崩溃，即使环境似乎没有发生戏剧性的变化。PI建议将与这种行为相一致的社会变革过程的模型形式化。