Information Aggregation and Positive Self Image
Information Aggregation and Positive Self Image
批准号:
0550535
负责人:
Joel Sobel
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
2006
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2006-07-01 至 2010-06-30
中文摘要
在这项研究中,两个新的模型的决策和信息处理。 这些模型的数学性质将引起经济理论家的兴趣。 此外,由此产生的模型将有助于组织令人困惑的观察结果,并提出理解和处理行为偏见的新方法,其中一个模型研究了群体极化现象:群体倾向于做出更极端的决定,而群体中的个体则会孤立地做出决定。 关于这一主题的文献经常将群体极化与非理性联系起来,但它并没有提供理性行为的模型。 本研究建立了一个基准模型。该模型使人们有可能调查,当有一个系统的关系的决定,个人会孤立地作出决定,同一个人会允许共享信息,并选择一个共识的选择。 第二个模型解释了人们倾向于拥有积极的自我形象的发现:当与他人比较时,个体高估了自己的优秀品质。 该模型假设人们知道自己的质量,但观察他人的质量有误差,这可能是有偏见的。 该模型能够描述积极自我形象的主要动机模型无法解释的经验性错误。 例如,该模型预测了在某些情况下消极自我形象的存在,并暗示当容易获得成功时,会有更多的积极自我形象。 更广泛的影响:认识到决策者在做出选择的方式上表现出系统性偏差,这对经济制度的设计有影响。 积极的自我形象与过度冒险和糟糕的生命周期规划(无论是在职业选择还是储蓄行为)有关。 这项研究中对积极自我形象的解释表明,提供更多信息的自然干预将减少决策偏差。 群体极化现象促使一些法律的学者提出了对陪审团制度的改革,特别是关于陪审团在分配惩罚性赔偿方面的作用。 如果没有本研究中开发的模型,就无法评估这些建议的成本和效益。
英文摘要
Two novel models of decision making and information processing are developed in this study. The mathematical properties of these models will be of interest to economic theorists. In addition, the resulting models will help to organize puzzling observations and suggest new ways to understand and deal with behavioral biases.One model examines the group polarization phenomenon: the tendency for groups to make more extreme decisions that the individuals within the group would make in isolation. The literature on this topic often associates group polarization with irrationality, but it does not supply a model of what rational behavior is. This study develops a benchmark model. The model makes it possible to investigate when there is a systematic relationship between the decisions individual would make in isolation and the decisions the same individuals would make it permitted to share information and select a consensus choice. The conditions under which group polarization is consistent with the rational model are also determined.The second model accounts for the finding that people tend to have positive self image: when comparing themselves to others, individuals overestimate their good qualities. The model assumes that people know their own quality, but observe the quality of others with an error, which may be biased due. The model is capable of describing empirical regularities that are not explained by the leading motivational models of positive self image. For example, the model predicts the existence of negative self imagine under some circumstance and implies that there will be more positive self image when success is easy to obtain. The model makes testable predictions that distinguish it from alternative models.Broader Impacts: Recognition that decision makers exhibit systematic biases in the way that they make choices has implications for the design of economic institutions. Positive self image has been associated with excessive risk taking and poor life-cycle planning (either in career choice or savings behavior). The explanation for positive self image offered in this study suggests that a natural intervention, providing more information, will reduce decision making bias. The phenomenon of group polarization has led some legal scholars to propose reforms to the jury system, especially with respect to the jury's role in assigning punitive damages. One cannot evaluate the cost and benefits of these proposals without a model like the one developed in this study.
期刊论文(0)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
Topics in Information Economics: Deception, Damage, and Privacy
-
批准号:2116165
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$25.4万
-
财政年份:2021
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Building an Economic Theory of Deception, Persuasion, and Information Sharing
-
批准号:1757250
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$21.35万
-
财政年份:2018
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Information Aggregation and Conventions
-
批准号:1326376
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$25.37万
-
财政年份:2013
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Communication and Decisions
-
批准号:0922565
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$23.0万
-
财政年份:2009
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Topics in Reciprocity and Standards
-
批准号:9977110
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$11.31万
-
财政年份:1999
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Rational Institutions for Nonrational Agents
-
批准号:9514809
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$18.45万
-
财政年份:1996
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Approaches to Communication in Games
-
批准号:9223091
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$16.67万
-
财政年份:1993
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Approaches to Communications in Games
-
批准号:9023036
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$7.91万
-
财政年份:1991
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Studies in Games and Incentives
-
批准号:8907218
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$6.44万
-
财政年份:1989
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information
-
批准号:8604986
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$4.78万
-
财政年份:1986
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
Voluntary Disclosure of Information And The Effect Of Rules
-
批准号:8408655
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$3.9万
-
财政年份:1984
-
负责人:Joel Sobel
-
依托单位:
海外基金