Approaches to Communication in Games

本研究由四个项目组成， 代理之间的信息传输。 一项研究将 研究廉价谈话游戏中的进化稳定结果。 关于私人信息的沟通在一个 进化框架 它迫使玩家获得有效的 当没有利益冲突存在时的收益。 我们的目标是学习 进化的力量是否有利于知情方， 当通话便宜但不免费时，信息被有效地使用， 当参与者的兴趣 部分重合。 该项目还将描述 当代理人有不同的兴趣时，必须进行沟通。 一项相关的研究将调查交流游戏， 随着时间的推移，为了发现单词是否会有意义， 适用于多个上下文，以及代理是否会使用 在复杂的环境中诚实地说，即使这是对他们的 短期战略利益。 第三个项目将提供 研究偏离均衡的一般框架 改进和动态行为。 这个话题有很强的 与沟通，虽然没有直接关系， 到沟通。 这项研究将使我们更好地了解 导致了进化稳定的 战略不存在。 第四个项目将研究一种具体的通信模式， 为了描述最佳授权的条件， 决策权交给知情专家（医生） 医患关系）。 在该模型中，患者可以是 无法获得完美的信息，因为他是 或者是因为它不符合最佳利益， 让医生彻底沟通。 可能不适合 患者应给予患者完全的决策权。 因为医生的偏好与医生的偏好不同， 因为医生不知道病人的 偏好 初步研究表明，充分的沟通可能 当医生和病人有不同的时候， 喜好

This research consists of four projects related to effective transmission of information between agents. One study will investigate evolutionarily stable outcomes in cheap-talk games. Communication about private information cannot be ignored in an evolutionary framework. It forces players to obtain efficient payoffs when no conflicts of interest exist. The goal is to study whether evolutionary forces favor the informed party, whether messages are used efficiently when talk is cheap but not free, and whether nontrivial communication must occur when players' interests partially coincide. The project will also characterize how much must be communicated when agents have different interests. A related study will investigate games of communication that change over time in order to discover whether words will take on meanings that apply in more than one context and whether agents will use words honestly in complicated settings even if it is against their short-term strategic interests. The third project will provide a general framework for studying deviation-based equilibrium refinements and dynamic behavior in games. This topic has strong connections with communication, although it is not directly related to communication. This study will better our understanding of results in situations where evolutionarily stable sets of strategies fail to exist. The fourth project will study a specific model of communication in order to describe conditions under which it is optimal to delegate decision-making authority to an informed expert (the doctor in a doctor-patient relationship). In the model the patient may be unable to acquire perfect information either because he is boundedly rational or because it is not in the best interests of the doctor to communicate completely. It may be inappropriate for the patient to give complete decision-making authority to the doctor either because the doctor's preference is different from the patient's or because the doctor does not know the patient's preference. Preliminary study suggests that full communication may be impossible whenever the doctor and the patient have different preferences.