Information Aggregation and Conventions

信息聚合和约定

• 批准号: 1326376
• 负责人: Joel Sobel
• 金额: $ 25.37万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2013-09-01 至 2018-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1326376&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Information; Aggregation; Conventions

Abstract: This award funds research in the economic theory of information. The objective of the research is to obtain a better understanding of the reasons why people fail to take advantage of available information in strategic settings. The PI develops new models that organize observations about how people share and use information. He then works out the formal implications of these models and frames hypotheses that can be used to test the models and distinguish between them. This project contributes to game theory, develops concepts and a taxonomy to give rigorous foundation to ideas about coordination, conventions, argumentation, and social comparison, and suggests ways to structure economic environments to improve performance. Failures to share information within and between groups can lead to significant costs in the decision making of committees, juries, and corporations. The research will provide new insight into how to structure the organizing rules of such committees to reduce communication failures.

翻译后摘要：该奖项的资金在信息经济理论的研究。 研究的目的是更好地了解人们在战略环境中未能利用现有信息的原因。 PI开发了新的模型来组织人们如何分享和使用信息的观察。 然后，他得出了这些模型的正式含义，并提出了可用于测试模型和区分模型的假设。 该项目有助于博弈论，开发概念和分类，为协调，惯例，论证和社会比较的想法提供严格的基础，并提出构建经济环境以提高绩效的方法。 如果不能在小组内部和小组之间共享信息，可能会导致委员会、陪审团和公司在决策过程中付出巨大代价。 该研究将为如何构建此类委员会的组织规则以减少沟通失败提供新的见解。