Approaches to Communications in Games

直觉和经验表明，个人使用语言， 解决战略问题，但纳什均衡， 非合作博弈论中使用的解决方案概念，不 提供一个合理的框架，在这个框架中，有意义的沟通可以 起来。 该项目的主要目标是严格定义 在那里玩家将使用通信来达到更有效的 结果和沟通将无法改善结果的地方。 该项目调查的想法，如果沟通是 可能，然后通信方法的演变和防止球员 从低效率的均衡开始。 该研究采用了 进化稳定策略（ESS） 它超越了早期 因为它不假设语言具有焦点意义 但允许单词的含义作为一个 进化稳定均衡 进化稳定 策略在很多博弈中都不存在。 该项目探讨 进化稳定均衡的替代定义， 可持续地捕捉不断发展的非合作系统的动态 与沟通。 游戏中的沟通结果 研究了哪些智能体具有私有信息。 一个新的一般 建立了信号博弈模型。 该项目开发了一个通用框架， 沟通影响理性经济人之间讨价还价的方式 情报不全的特工 结果应该提供新的 对一系列重要经济问题的深刻见解。 这 这项工作扩展了研究人员以前对寡头垄断的研究 理论、税收政策、组织设计和诉讼。 的 发展可供选择的一般概念 稳定平衡最终会被证明对数学 生物学 对语言进化的研究可以使 对语言学的贡献

Intuition and experience indicate that individuals use language to solve strategic problems, but the Nash equilibrium, the principal solution concept used in non-cooperative game theory, does not provide a sensible framework in which meaningful communication can arise. The principal goal of this project is to rigorously define where players will use communication to arrive at more efficient outcomes and where communication will fail to improve the outcome. The project investigates the idea that if communication is possible, then methods of communication evolve and prevent players from playing inefficient equilibria. The study uses the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). It goes beyond earlier work because it does not assume that language has a focal meaning but allows the meaning of words to arise as part of an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Evolutionarily stable strategies fail to exist in many games. The project explores alternative definitions of evolutionarily stable equilibria that plausibly capture the dynamics of evolving non-cooperative systems with communication. The outcomes of communication in games in which agents have private information are studied. A new general model of signalling games is developed. This project develops a general framework for rigorously analyzing the way communication influences bargaining among rational economic agents with incomplete information. The results should provide new insights into a wide range of important economic problems. This work extends previous research by the investigator on oligopoly theory, tax policy, organizational design and litigation. The development of alternative general concepts of evolutionarily stable equilibrium could prove useful eventually to mathematical biology. The research on the evolution of language could make a contribution to linguistics.