Approaches to Communications in Games

直觉和经验表明，个体使用语言来解决战略问题，但纳什均衡（非合作博弈论中使用的主要解决方案概念）并没有提供一个合理的框架，在这个框架中可以产生有意义的沟通。这个项目的主要目标是严格定义玩家将在哪些地方使用沟通来获得更有效的结果，以及哪些地方沟通将无法改善结果。该项目研究的观点是，如果交流是可能的，那么交流的方法就会进化，从而防止玩家陷入低效的平衡。该研究使用了进化稳定策略（ESS）的概念。它超越了早期的工作，因为它没有假设语言有一个焦点意义，而是允许单词的意义作为进化稳定平衡的一部分出现。进化稳定的策略在许多博弈中并不存在。该项目探索了进化稳定平衡的另一种定义，这种定义合理地捕捉了具有通信的进化非合作系统的动态。研究了具有私有信息的主体在博弈中的交流结果。提出了一种新的通用信号博弈模型。该项目开发了一个通用框架，用于严格分析信息不完全的理性经济主体之间的沟通影响议价的方式。研究结果应该为一系列重要的经济问题提供新的见解。这项工作扩展了先前研究者在寡头垄断理论、税收政策、组织设计和诉讼方面的研究。进化稳定平衡的其他一般概念的发展最终可能证明对数学生物学是有用的。对语言演化的研究可以为语言学的发展做出贡献。

Intuition and experience indicate that individuals use language to solve strategic problems, but the Nash equilibrium, the principal solution concept used in non-cooperative game theory, does not provide a sensible framework in which meaningful communication can arise. The principal goal of this project is to rigorously define where players will use communication to arrive at more efficient outcomes and where communication will fail to improve the outcome. The project investigates the idea that if communication is possible, then methods of communication evolve and prevent players from playing inefficient equilibria. The study uses the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). It goes beyond earlier work because it does not assume that language has a focal meaning but allows the meaning of words to arise as part of an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Evolutionarily stable strategies fail to exist in many games. The project explores alternative definitions of evolutionarily stable equilibria that plausibly capture the dynamics of evolving non-cooperative systems with communication. The outcomes of communication in games in which agents have private information are studied. A new general model of signalling games is developed. This project develops a general framework for rigorously analyzing the way communication influences bargaining among rational economic agents with incomplete information. The results should provide new insights into a wide range of important economic problems. This work extends previous research by the investigator on oligopoly theory, tax policy, organizational design and litigation. The development of alternative general concepts of evolutionarily stable equilibrium could prove useful eventually to mathematical biology. The research on the evolution of language could make a contribution to linguistics.