Building an Economic Theory of Deception, Persuasion, and Information Sharing

建立欺骗、说服和信息共享的经济理论

• 批准号: 1757250
• 负责人: Joel Sobel
• 金额: $ 21.35万
• 依托单位: University of California-San Diego
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-07-01 至 2023-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1757250&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Building; Economic; Theory; Deception; Persuasion

This research project will develop a general theory for how individuals use deceptive behavior for strategic advantage. The theory will prove a clearer foundation for a range of applications. Many issues in policy and law involve attempts to limit how people share information. For example, deception and fraud are central issues for consumer protection and business law. In other contexts, firms or governments may restrict the ability of their employees to share information with outside parties. Game theory has given us powerful insights on how people can use private information and deceptive behavior for strategic advantage, but the existing theories use inconsistent definitions and are not part of a single framework. The project will give us a better understanding of when deceptive behavior is damaging, how and when to punish unauthorized information sharing, and how the availability of detailed information about individuals will affect targeted persuasion attempts. The project advances the progress of science in game theory, and the new theory will help us understand how to develop laws and policies that promote national goals.The project includes four main components. First is a general program to clarify the foundations of strategic models of deception in a framework that is flexible enough to permit non-equilibrium behavior and costs associated with lying. The second is a model of persuasion in electoral competition . The third is a model of unauthorized sharing of information that investigates the costs and benefits of policies that punish individuals who share information. The fourth project proves the shared assumptions needed to rule out coordination failures in non-cooperative settings.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

这个研究项目将为个人如何利用欺骗行为获得战略优势开发一个通用理论。该理论将为一系列应用提供更清晰的基础。政策和法律中的许多问题都涉及试图限制人们如何分享信息。例如，欺骗和欺诈是消费者保护和商业法的核心问题。在其他情况下，公司或政府可能会限制其员工与外部各方共享信息的能力。博弈论为我们提供了关于人们如何利用私人信息和欺骗行为获得战略优势的强大见解，但现有的理论使用不一致的定义，并且不是单一框架的一部分。该项目将使我们更好地了解何时欺骗行为是有害的，如何以及何时惩罚未经授权的信息共享，以及有关个人的详细信息的可用性将如何影响有针对性的说服尝试。 该项目推进了博弈论的科学进步，新理论将帮助我们理解如何制定促进国家目标的法律和政策。首先是一个通用程序，以澄清的基础上的战略模型的欺骗框架，是灵活的，足以允许非平衡行为和成本与说谎。第二个是选举竞争中的说服模式。第三个是未经授权的信息共享模型，该模型调查了惩罚共享信息的个人的政策的成本和收益。第四个项目证明了排除非合作环境中协调失败所需的共同假设。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Parak Pathak: Winner of the 2018 Clark Medal

Parak Pathak：2018 年克拉克奖章获得者

• DOI: 10.1257/jep.33.1.231
• 发表时间: 2019
• 期刊: The Journal of economic perspectives
• 作者: Pakes, Ariel;Sobel, Joel
• 通讯作者: Sobel, Joel

Parag Pathak: Winner of the 2018 Clark Medal

Parag Pathak：2018 年克拉克奖章获得者

• DOI: 10.1257/jep.31.1.231
• 发表时间: 2019
• 期刊: The Journal of economic perspectives
• 作者: Pakes, Ariel;Sobel, Joel
• 通讯作者: Sobel, Joel

Iterated weak dominance and interval‐dominance supermodular games

迭代弱支配和区间支配超模博弈

• DOI: 10.3982/te2904
• 发表时间: 2019
• 期刊: Theoretical economics
• 影响因子: 1.7
• 作者: Sobel, Joel

Lying and Deception in Games

• DOI: 10.1086/704754
• 发表时间: 2020-03-01
• 期刊: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• 影响因子: 8.2
• 作者: Sobel, Joel