Building an Economic Theory of Deception, Persuasion, and Information Sharing

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This research project will develop a general theory for how individuals use deceptive behavior for strategic advantage. The theory will prove a clearer foundation for a range of applications. Many issues in policy and law involve attempts to limit how people share information. For example, deception and fraud are central issues for consumer protection and business law. In other contexts, firms or governments may restrict the ability of their employees to share information with outside parties. Game theory has given us powerful insights on how people can use private information and deceptive behavior for strategic advantage, but the existing theories use inconsistent definitions and are not part of a single framework. The project will give us a better understanding of when deceptive behavior is damaging, how and when to punish unauthorized information sharing, and how the availability of detailed information about individuals will affect targeted persuasion attempts. The project advances the progress of science in game theory, and the new theory will help us understand how to develop laws and policies that promote national goals.The project includes four main components. First is a general program to clarify the foundations of strategic models of deception in a framework that is flexible enough to permit non-equilibrium behavior and costs associated with lying. The second is a model of persuasion in electoral competition . The third is a model of unauthorized sharing of information that investigates the costs and benefits of policies that punish individuals who share information. The fourth project proves the shared assumptions needed to rule out coordination failures in non-cooperative settings.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.