Communication and Decisions

该奖项资助经济理论研究，开发沟通如何影响经济决策在三个不同的背景下的新模型。第一个项目建立和分析群体决策模型。 目标是预测导致群体以两极分化的方式行事的具体情况。 社会学和组织行为学的研究为两极分化提供了强有力的经验证据;群体往往会做出比单个群体成员自己做出的更极端的决定。 我们的目标是预测特定的情况下，导致两极分化，即使每个群体成员是在一个理性的方式行事。第二个项目开发了一个通用的方法，在游戏中的沟通不对称信息，特别是信号游戏。 本研究提供了一个统一的框架，其中包含了广泛的纳什均衡refinements.The第三个项目开始与另一个记录的实证结果：经济决策者往往更诚实，比将由标准的理性行为者模型预测。 本项目开发了一种新的模型，其中个人的诚实行为作为一种信号。这项研究将心理学和社会学的见解带入经济学家使用的正式建模框架。 关于两极分化的项目应具有特别的跨学科影响。

This award funds research in economic theory that develops new models of how communication affects economic decisions in three different contexts.The first project builds and analyzes a model of group decision making. The goal is to predict the specific circumstances that lead groups to behave in a polarized manner. Research in sociology and organizational behavior has provided strong empirical evidence for polarization; groups tend to make more extreme decisions than an individual group member would make on his or her own. The goal is to predict the specific circumstances that lead to polarization even when each group member is acting in a rational way.The second project develops a general approach to communication in games of asymmetric information, especially signaling games. This research provides a unifying framework that incorporates a wide range of Nash equilibrium refinements.The third project starts with another documented empirical result: economic decision makers are frequently more honest than would be predicted by the standard rational actor model. This project develops a new model in which individuals behave honestly as a way to signal.This research brings insights from psychology and sociology into the formal modeling framework used by economists. The project on polarization should have particular interdisciplinary impact.