Electricity Auction: Optimization, Market Behaviors, and Comparative Studies

电力拍卖：优化、市场行为和比较研究

• 批准号: 0621936
• 负责人: Peter Luh
• 金额: $ 24万
• 依托单位: University of Connecticut
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-09-01 至 2011-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0621936&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Electricity; Auction; Optimization; Market; Behaviors

ECS-0621936 Electricity Auction: Optimization, Market Behaviors, and Comparative Studies Deregulated electricity markets use an auction mechanism to select generation offers and their levels for energy and ancillary services. A settlement scheme is then used to determine the payments. Currently, most independent system operators (ISOs) use an auction mechanism that minimizes the total offer costs ("offer cost minimization"), but determine what consumers have to pay by using a settlement scheme that pays uniform market clearing prices (MCPs) or congestion-dependent Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). Illustrative examples have shown that for a given set of offers, an auction mechanism that directly minimizes the payment costs ("payment cost minimization") could considerably reduce the total payment cost. This observation has led to serious discussions among stakeholders and policymakers as to which of the two auction mechanisms is more appropriate for ISOs. While methods for offer cost minimization abound, limited approaches for payment cost minimization exist in view of its distinct and fundamental difficulties. In collaboration with Southern California Edison and ISO-New England, this proposal will to develop payment cost minimization methods to include key ISO practices such as simultaneous auctions of energy and ancillary services and transmission capacity constraints. Theoretical and computational issues will be investigated. These results will then be validated by ISO-New England data though a proper construction of scaled-down markets and the innovative training of neural networks to compare the two mechanisms in terms of payment costs, production efficiency, and long-term investment signals. IIntellectual merits include the novel mathematical and computational methods to resolve the new classes of problems, including strategic behaviors of participants, and the innovative validation approach. The research has broader impacts of enabling the research, development, as well as policy-making communities to assess the merits of auction mechanisms in a quantitative manner. The research will also impact the education of students and professionals through courses, online materials, and UConn's da Vinci program for high school teachers and counselors.

ECS-0621936电力拍卖：优化，市场行为和比较研究放松管制的电力市场使用拍卖机制来选择发电报价及其能源和辅助服务水平。 然后使用结算计划来确定付款。 目前，大多数独立系统运营商（ISOs）使用拍卖机制，使总报价成本最小化（“报价成本最小化”），但通过使用支付统一市场清算价格（MCP）或依赖于报价的LoCan边际价格（LMP）的结算方案来确定消费者必须支付的费用。 举例说明，对于一组给定的出价，直接最大限度地减少支付成本（“支付成本最小化”）的拍卖机制可以大大减少总支付成本。 这一意见导致利益攸关方和决策者就两种拍卖机制中哪一种更适合国际证券交易组织进行了认真的讨论。 虽然报价成本最小化的方法比比皆是，但鉴于其独特和根本的困难，支付成本最小化的方法有限。 与南加州爱迪生公司和ISO-新英格兰公司合作，该提案将开发支付成本最小化方法，以包括关键的ISO实践，如能源和辅助服务的同时拍卖和传输容量限制。 将研究理论和计算问题。 这些结果将通过ISO-新英格兰数据进行验证，通过适当构建缩小的市场和创新的神经网络训练来比较两种机制的支付成本，生产效率和长期投资信号。 智能的优点包括新的数学和计算方法来解决新的问题，包括参与者的战略行为，和创新的验证方法。 这项研究产生了更广泛的影响，使研究、开发和决策界能够以量化的方式评估拍卖机制的优点。 这项研究还将通过课程、在线材料和康州大学针对高中教师和辅导员的芬奇项目，影响学生和专业人士的教育。