Electricity Auction: Optimization, Market Behaviors, and Comparative Studies

电力拍卖：优化、市场行为和比较研究放松管制的电力市场使用拍卖机制来选择发电报价及其能源和辅助服务的水平。然后使用结算方案来确定付款。目前，大多数独立系统运营商（iso）使用拍卖机制来最小化总报价成本（“报价成本最小化”），但通过使用支付统一市场清算价格（mcp）或拥堵相关的位置边际价格（LMPs）的结算方案来确定消费者必须支付的费用。举例说明，对于给定的一组报价，直接最小化支付成本（“支付成本最小化”）的拍卖机制可以显著降低总支付成本。这一观察结果引发了利益相关者和政策制定者之间的认真讨论，即两种拍卖机制中哪一种更适合iso。出价成本最小化的方法有很多，但支付成本最小化的方法却有限，这是由于支付成本最小化所面临的独特而根本的困难。与南加州爱迪生公司和ISO-新英格兰公司合作，该提案将开发支付成本最小化的方法，包括关键的ISO实践，如能源和辅助服务的同时拍卖以及传输容量限制。理论和计算问题将被调查。这些结果将通过ISO-New England的数据进行验证，通过适当构建缩小规模的市场和创新的神经网络训练来比较两种机制在支付成本、生产效率和长期投资信号方面的差异。智力上的优点包括新颖的数学和计算方法来解决新的问题类别，包括参与者的战略行为，以及创新的验证方法。这项研究具有更广泛的影响，使研究、开发和决策团体能够以定量的方式评估拍卖机制的优点。这项研究还将通过课程、在线材料以及康涅狄格大学针对高中教师和辅导员的达芬奇项目，影响学生和专业人士的教育。

ECS-0621936 Electricity Auction: Optimization, Market Behaviors, and Comparative Studies Deregulated electricity markets use an auction mechanism to select generation offers and their levels for energy and ancillary services. A settlement scheme is then used to determine the payments. Currently, most independent system operators (ISOs) use an auction mechanism that minimizes the total offer costs ("offer cost minimization"), but determine what consumers have to pay by using a settlement scheme that pays uniform market clearing prices (MCPs) or congestion-dependent Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs). Illustrative examples have shown that for a given set of offers, an auction mechanism that directly minimizes the payment costs ("payment cost minimization") could considerably reduce the total payment cost. This observation has led to serious discussions among stakeholders and policymakers as to which of the two auction mechanisms is more appropriate for ISOs. While methods for offer cost minimization abound, limited approaches for payment cost minimization exist in view of its distinct and fundamental difficulties. In collaboration with Southern California Edison and ISO-New England, this proposal will to develop payment cost minimization methods to include key ISO practices such as simultaneous auctions of energy and ancillary services and transmission capacity constraints. Theoretical and computational issues will be investigated. These results will then be validated by ISO-New England data though a proper construction of scaled-down markets and the innovative training of neural networks to compare the two mechanisms in terms of payment costs, production efficiency, and long-term investment signals. IIntellectual merits include the novel mathematical and computational methods to resolve the new classes of problems, including strategic behaviors of participants, and the innovative validation approach. The research has broader impacts of enabling the research, development, as well as policy-making communities to assess the merits of auction mechanisms in a quantitative manner. The research will also impact the education of students and professionals through courses, online materials, and UConn's da Vinci program for high school teachers and counselors.