TC: Small: A Secure Trojan-Resistant Application-Specific Integrated Circuit Architecture

TC：小型：安全的防木马专用集成电路架构

• 批准号: 1117755
• 负责人: Kenneth Mai
• 金额: $ 50万
• 依托单位: Carnegie-Mellon University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2011
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2011-08-01 至 2014-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1117755&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TC; Small; Secure; Trojan; Resistant

Globalization and horizontal stratification of the semiconductor industry has exacerbated the threat of a compromise in the integrated circuit manufacturing supply chain. Specifically, intellectual property theft, unauthorized production, and hardware Trojan horse insertion are of significant concern. Further, the proliferation of advanced semiconductor fabrication equipment and expertise has enabled novel attacks against integrated circuits in the field. Recently, side-channel attacks that bypass the theoretical strength of cryptographic algorithms by exploiting inadvertent information leakage have shown to be particularly effective while requiring only a modest budget and expertise. Most extant countermeasures retrofit security features onto existing design flows, rather than build-in security from the ground up. This project develops a novel application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) architecture designed from the ground up to resist hardware Trojan horse insertion and have low side-channel information leakage, while still achieving high performance, low power, compact area, and future scalability. The architecture consists of an array of logic gates implemented as read-only memory (ROM) look-up tables (LUTs) interconnected by a reconfigurable network. The ROM LUTs achieve efficient operation with low side-channel emissions and are highly scalable due to their regular structure. The reconfigurable interconnect enables design obfuscation, metering of production, and complete internal node observability and controllability in order to detect hardware Trojans. The very nature of the architecture deters Trojan insertion and enables non-destructive post-manufacturing Trojan detection. The architecture has wide applicability across a range of ICs, from microprocessors to ASICs, that require efficient designs capable of secure operation

半导体产业的全球化和水平分层加剧了集成电路制造供应链妥协的威胁。具体而言，知识产权盗窃、未经授权的生产和硬件特洛伊木马插入是值得关注的问题。此外，先进的半导体制造设备和专业技术的扩散已经使得能够对该领域中的集成电路进行新颖的攻击。最近，通过利用无意的信息泄漏绕过加密算法的理论强度的侧信道攻击已被证明是特别有效的，同时只需要适度的预算和专业知识。大多数现存的对策将安全功能改进到现有的设计流程中，而不是从头开始内置安全性。该项目开发了一种新的专用集成电路（ASIC）架构，旨在抵抗硬件特洛伊木马插入，并具有低侧信道信息泄漏，同时仍然实现高性能，低功耗，紧凑的面积和未来的可扩展性。该架构由一个阵列的逻辑门实现为只读存储器（ROM）的查找表（LUT）互连的可重构网络。ROM LUT实现了具有低侧信道发射的高效操作，并且由于其规则结构而具有高度可扩展性。可重新配置的互连实现设计混淆、生产计量以及完整的内部节点可观察性和可控制性，以便检测硬件特洛伊木马。该架构的本质阻止了特洛伊木马的插入，并实现了非破坏性的制造后特洛伊木马检测。该架构在从微处理器到ASIC的一系列IC中具有广泛的适用性，这些IC需要能够安全操作的高效设计